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16 JUNE 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: ALLIED ATTITUDES TOWARD SDI EXAMINED

West European 'Duplicity'

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 24 Mar 86 pp 18-19

[Article by V. Boikov: "Both Carrot and Stick"]

[Text] Three years ago President Ronald Reagan announced his Strategic Defense Initiative.

Has Washington succeeded in harnessing its allies to SDI? What will participation in this space adventure of their transatlantic patron give them? Are they aware of the consequences with which involvement in SDI is fraught? These questions are discussed below.

Few in Western Europe believe that it is possible to create a "space shield" capable of preventing nuclear war and making the future of mankind secure. Most people realize that the militarization of outer space will further escalate the arms race and make peace less stable. Nevertheless, more and more West European politicians and businessmen are coming out in support of SDI, joining in its realization, or evincing an interest in it.

The leaders of some countries, above all Britain and the F.R.G., have publicly gone back on their initial criticism of SDI. Washington is now counting on other partners, following the example of London, Bonn and Rome, joining in the "star wars" project shortly. With the exception of Greece and Australia, whose governments have declared that their countries will not take part in SDI either directly or indirectly other U.S. allies take an equivocal stand.

Brussels, for instance, says that the final decision has not yet been taken. At the same time, official spokesmen, ministers included, publicly eulogize SDI. Paris and The Hague are officially

against involvement in the U.S. space war programme, but nevertheless welcome the inclusion in it of industrial firms and research centres in France and the Netherlands.

Behind this duplicity one can discern the traditional orientation on Washington, a striving to profit by entering into space contracts, and the hope of gaining access to the most up-to-date technology. Propaganda plays a no small part in the efforts to involve Western Europe in SDI. Along with Washington, NATO is playing an active part in this brainwashing campaign.

The Atlanticist leaders miss no opportunity to offer "good advice" to West European politicians, industrialists and scientists. They organize diverse briefings, conferences, and other assemblies addressed by the men in charge of SDI and its supporters. Pressure is brought to bear on the intransigent. An instance of this propaganda drive is the speech General Bernard Rogers, NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, delivered in Brussels on February 27. Admitting that the views of the NATO allies on "star wars" vary, Rogers voiced apprehensions that the debate on this issue "could

become so divisive that cohesion and unity would be affected." To prevent this and to reassure the allies, the general argued that there really was no cause for controversy. SDI, he said, was not a programme for the development of weapons but a research plan directed, moreover, at developing "conventional defence" and not offensive systems. Washington, he maintained, is now trying to ascertain whether such a "defensive system" was at all possible, what it would cost, and how effective it would be.

In other words, SDI is not only perfectly safe but profitable to boot. "Even if defensive systems were never deployed, the spin-offs would be considerable," the general argued. But neither did he forget the traditional "stick" — the mythical "Soviet threat." If the Soviets outstripped the United States, "we would find ourselves in a very difficult situation," he said.

The NATO Supreme Commander urged West Europeans not to limit themselves to supporting SDI but to go further to the deployment in Western Europe of an "anti-missile shield," something in the order of a ground-based appendage to the American SDI. The idea of working out a "European defence initiative" (EDI) was first advanced by the Americans, and now it is vigorously pushed by Bonn, and primarily F.R.G. Defence Minister Manfred Wörner. Rogers was

"disappointed" to find that the other European countries "had not taken seriously West German proposals." In his opinion, the allies should cooperate in both SDI and EDI. The one does not exclude the other.

Many prominent experts have underscored the dangers with which such plans are fraught. But the fact remains that the American bait is being taken. Why do some West European leaders close their eyes to the gravity of the threat attendant on the realization of the U.S. "star wars" plans? In reply to this question, Benoît d'Abouville, deputy director for disarmament in the French Foreign Ministry, recalled a French folk story. Its gist is this. The pope of Avignon wanted to talk with his mule and offered a large sum of money to anyone who taught the animal to speak. A peasant responded to the offer and returned home with the reward in his pocket after having promised to teach the mule to talk in ten years' time. Hearing of this, his fellow villagers asked him what he was counting on. In ten years, he replied, one of us will be dead—the mule, the pope, or I.

The tale may be an amusing one, but building present-day policy on inanity of cunning is a risky business.

UK: Fears for Deterrence

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 24 May 86 pp 19-21

[Article by M. Bogdanov: "Tale of Complicity"]

[Text]

Just over a year ago, in the capacity of a member of the board of the Foreign Press Association in London, I had occasion to be involved in making the arrangements for a debate on space defence systems. A debate of course presupposes that its participants represent different, and better still, contrary viewpoints. As it was, however, we had trouble in finding among prominent British political figures votaries of Reagan's "star wars" programme whom we could invite to take part. Finally we found one who agreed to

take up the cudgels on behalf of the scheme—the well-known anti-Soviet Lord Challont. And he did so with reservations.

At that time SDI came under criticism from literally all sides, the Tory leadership included. Shortly before the debate, Margaret Thatcher, during her Washington visit, had come out against the deployment of ABM systems in outer space. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Malcolm Rifkind had hinted broadly of the aggressive character of the "star wars" programme, and Minister

of State for Defence Procurement Geoffrey Pattie predicted an enormous growth of military spending if it were implemented.

A little more than six months later the Tory government became the first of the U.S. allies to sign with the United States an agreement on participation in SDI research. How did this come about?

In March 1982 London and Washington had concluded a deal on the rearmament of the "independent" British nuclear deterrent force with costly American Trident-2 missiles. Whitehall was jubilant: at long last Britain's previous membership in the "nuclear club" had been prolonged for decades. In Trident Downing Street saw a trump card in Britain's struggle for a "place under the sun" in the EEC, and later it might serve as the groundwork for the creation of a West European nuclear potential.

Just then the U.S. President unexpectedly put forward another concept that knocked the ground from under the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine and along with it the Trident deterrence potential so dear (both literally and figuratively) to official London. For if, following the American, a Soviet space "shield" were to appear, this would make possession of Tridents meaningless.

London also feared that the realization of SDI, by nullifying the existing Soviet-American understandings, in particular the ABM Treaty, would upset strategic stability and deliver the death blow to the nuclear arms control process. If both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed space "shields" or if the Soviet Union substantially increased its strategic offensive potential, "unprotected" Western Europe would inevitably be doomed to become a battlefield between the two world powers. Imagination conjured up the fearful vision of the Americans, confident of their strategic invulnerability, turning their backs on their allies and transatlantic solidarity coming to an end.

Evidently because of this Margaret Thatcher, during her talks with President Reagan in December 1984 and February last year, persistently but unsuccessfully sought to extract assurances that all plans for testing and deploying weapons systems within the framework of SDI would be made the subject of

Soviet-American talks and consultations with the United States' allies. At the same time Britain did not object to research under the SDI programme on the plea that, for one thing, the Soviet Union had allegedly been engaged in such research for a long time, and, for another, effective control over such research was impossible. Actually it was already at the Camp David meeting of Reagan and Margaret Thatcher that the basis was laid for British participation in the initial, "research" stage of the "star wars" programme.

After returning from her pilgrimage across the ocean, the British Prime Minister tried to justify Britain's consent to take part in SDI research by ascribing it to the fact that President Reagan's decision "could not be changed." Participation in the U.S. programme in one or another way, she maintained, would enable Britain to influence the U.S. position.

True enough, the U.S. President is not easily persuaded. The point, however, is that Washington was quick to sense Britain's inconsistency. Following the critical view voiced in public by British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe, the U.S. Administration stepped up efforts to gain the backing of its allies by offering them economic inducements. In late March last year U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger formally invited them to join in SDI research, promising private business in these countries a big share in the \$26 billion earmarked for contracts.

London weighed the proposition for quite some time. On the one hand, the Conservatives were the loudest of all in criticizing the "star wars" concept. The leaders of the British war office were well aware of how difficult it would be to halt the research, which would lead to testing and eventually the deployment of space weapons. On the other hand, monopoly quarters feared that in the process of SDI research the U.S. could widen the technological gap between itself and Western Europe. Perhaps it was better to swallow one's too outspoken words, line up for the multi-billion-dollar transatlantic feed bag and, making use of the "special relationship," ensure oneself access to advanced American technology! In time, the reasoning went, this could be used as a trump card to gain technological leadership in the EEC.

At first, to be on the safe side, official London (scared, incidentally, by Wash-

ington's angry reaction to Howe's speech) toned down criticism of the "star wars" programme. And then the carrot of economic and technological benefits outweighed British objections to the programme on the military and political plane.

Britain was the first to enter into negotiations with the U.S. on the terms of the participation of British firms in SDI research. Above all, it wanted U.S. guarantees of free access to American technology and permission for commercial use by British firms of the results of that research, as well as a substantial share, running to \$1.5 billion, in the orders placed under the programme. Finally, in December last year an arrangement was concluded between the two countries regulating their cooperation in "star wars" research, specifically, the participation in it of British firms.

Here we have another instance of Britain toeing the White House line. Moreover, the Tory cabinet seemed to have completely forgotten the serious reservations it had had as regards the military and political consequences of the "star wars" programme.

However, in their drive for economic and political dividends from SDI, the Conservatives, as so many times before, did not reckon with the cunning of their ally. On the plea that government contracts necessarily had to remain confidential, Washington declined to give any guarantees that the British demands would be met. On the other hand, the participation agreement provides for British researchers working in the United States, a plain case of brain drain. More than 30 British firms and research institutions fell for the American bait and evinced readiness to take part in SDI research. However, even official Whitehall spokesmen have had to admit that so far no more than 10 contracts to a total value of \$1,000,000 are being negotiated and that there are not likely to be any bigger deals for two or three years. British industrialists are rapidly losing faith in Britain obtaining in the next five years—the time allotted by the Americans for SDI research—contracts anywhere near the \$1.5 billion former Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine bargained for. Instead, the British are being offered the role of subcontractors for giant Pentagon suppliers like Rockwell, Boeing and Martin-Marietta.

Nor have Tory hopes of involvement in SDI giving a new spur to the British-U.S. "special relationship" materialized. The Reagan Administration of course wants "respectable and prestigious" Britain to be a party to the project, but there are no indications that the Americans are ready to reward British "loyalty" with any privileges. Moreover, as the British Financial Times rightly observed, U.S. officials are worried about the political weight Britain might gain by full involvement in the "star wars" programme.

In short, judging by British press comment and the remarks of certain officials, cooperation between the "special partners" is not working out. Both the City and Downing Street are beginning to realize to their horror that instead of handing out a fat slice of the \$26 billion SDI pie, Washington intends to make its allies finance their own research under the project, while reserving the right to skim the cream off the final results. More, London has allowed its hands to be tied by American laws on the protection of state secrets. British firms and scientists involved in "star wars" research are shamelessly made subject to American loyalty tests. They are strictly forbidden to comment publicly on their work and particularly on possible setbacks and lags behind the official timetable.

The debate on the SDI programme in the House of Lords in late February showed that opposition to the shortsighted policy of the Tory government is mounting in Britain. The country's political and public circles are increasingly awakening to the fact that by embarking on the slippery path of participation in "star wars" research, the Tories have involved Britain in the Reagan Administration's efforts to destabilize the military-strategic balance between East and West. And this is fraught with the risk not only of Britain finding itself the loser economically, but of the groundwork being undermined for the revival of military deterrence in Europe, in which, according to recent public statements by the country's political leaders, Britain is very much interested.

FRG 'Most Loyal Supporter"

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 24 Mar 86 p 21

[Article by A. Tolpegin: "Key Role"]

[Text]

The international conferences sponsored annually in Munich by the F.R.G. military science association Wehrkunde bring together the cream of the elite—ministers, generals, members of parliament and particularly trusted journalists. Opinions are voiced at them more frankly than at official NATO sessions.

At last year's Munich conference Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl first declared in support of SDI, which he said "shifts the accent from offensive nuclear weapons to non-nuclear defensive armaments." To impart a semblance of objectivity to the Bonn approach to the American design, the Chancellor made a number of reservations. For one thing, he emphasized on the need to maintain strategic stability, which, he said, ruled out all striving for military superiority. It was clear, Kohl said, that the U.S. intended to sustain and eventually strengthen strategic stability by means of SDI.

Now Bonn has laid aside all doubts and has become the most loyal supporter of the U.S. plans for the militarization of outer space. In December last year the F.R.G. government, bypassing the parliament, decided to enter into talks on participation of F.R.G. firms in the SDI programme. A relevant agreement is expected to be signed by the end of March.

Now Munich has again been the venue of an assembly of high-placed visitors. From Washington came Fred Ikle of the Pentagon, who urged the United States' West European allies to join in SDI and to everybody's surprise said that strategic stability should not be a NATO objective at all. According to him, the West has to win the arms race. Such candour is rare. Actually Ikle only confirmed what the opponents of "star wars" have repeatedly warned against—that the realization of SDI would not make the world any safer and would not "devalue" nuclear arsenals. On the contrary, if the arms race is allowed to spill over into outer space, it will get out of hand and stability will be totally ruled out.

F.R.G. Defence Minister Manfred Wörner was not at all taken aback by Ikle's candour. Speaking at the Munich conference, he repeated the official Bonn evaluation of SDI as "justified, politically necessary and according with the security interests of the West as a whole." Moreover, the minister proposed complementing SDI with a European Defence Initiative—the creation of a system capable of destroying medium-range and tactical missiles.

To begin with, Wörner said, it would be a matter only of something in the order of "extended air defence." The purpose of such a system would not be the protection of the entire territory of Western Europe, and it would be land-, not space-based, and not directly linked with SDI. Wörner warned against building "castles in the air" and pressed for the modernization of existing armaments. At the same time SDI research would continue and some of its results could be used even before the development of a "finalized" European anti-missile system is completed. Wörner spoke of the possibility of using electromagnetic beam and laser weapons. Thus, his idea of "modernization" of air defence would be in a sense an intermediate stage on the way to the realization of SDI and its European variant.

What is the purport of the Wörner "initiative"?

First, it would make it possible to satisfy the appetites of the West European and primarily the F.R.G. war industry concerns. The bosses of these concerns already now are apprehensive, and with good reason, that the Pentagon will hand out the lion's share of SDI contracts to its own monopolies. The chairman of the board of Siemens, Karlheinz Kaske, complained recently about no more than \$250 million, or 5 per cent, of the \$5 billion allocated annually for the SDI programme going to the West Europeans. But if the European Defence Initiative were to be launched the figure would run into the billions, for this programme would be financed by the West European countries.

Second, the Werner "initiative" is aimed at overcoming the differences that are asserting themselves in NATO because of SDI. Bonn expects "modernization" of air defence to be more acceptable to the allies than the fantastic "star wars" scenarios. And through such modernization they could in one way or another join in the SDI programme.

It will be remembered that Bonn lent Washington a bigger hand than anyone else in giving effect to the NATO "double-track" decision. It not only agreed to the deployment of nu-

clear missiles on its own territory, but brought pressure to bear on the belated. A similar role is now allotted Bonn in giving effect to the plans for the militarization of outer space. This was openly admitted by the Federal Chancellor's foreign policy adviser Horst Teitschik. "Had the Federal Republic not sited the missiles, no one would have done so," he said. "In the realization of SDI too the key role belongs to the F.R.G."

Teitschik knew what he was talking about.

Italy: Eureka vs SDI

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11 24 Mar 86 pp 21-22

[Article by L. Makarevich: "Falling Over Themselves"]

[Text]

Sober-minded politicians in Italy have no illusions about SDI not being something much more than a research project. It is an attempt by the United States to lay its hands on everything new, forward-looking and promising in European scientific and technological thought, both military and civilian, to bring it all under its monopoly and to use it to establish Washington's global superiority. As the U.S. has tried to do so many times before using armed force, dollars, oil, food, nuclear technology and other expedients as levers.

For many Italian firms, especially war industry concerns, which make extensive use of American capital, equipment, patents and licences, technological dependence on the United States is an established fact. Also faced with problems are those Italian firms that are no less dependent on West European technology, on which the French Eureka project, aimed at accelerating the building of a "united Europe," is primarily oriented.

The new variant of the old adage about the choice between two bundles of hay was first of all formulated by Raffaele Paliari, vice-chairman of the Italian National Association of the Electrotechnic and Electronic Industries. Speaking of the contest between SDI and Eureka, he said:

"On the one hand, the political and

military prestige of the (transatlantic) superpower and its ability to unite its NATO partners are at stake. On the other hand, an opportunity is opening for the EEC to reanimate its political initiatives by giving a spur to cooperation among employers in the sphere of the latest technology."

Which, then, are the Italians to prefer: the United States of America or the United States of Europe?

Weighing the pros and cons, the Bettino Craxi government left it to the leading Italian concerns to make their choice independently. And they have done so. Their common opinion was expressed by the Fiat top executive Umberto Agnelli in the following cut-and-businesslike terms:

"The American programme is realistic, whereas Eureka is not. SDI is based on a serious, 1,200-page study and has a definite director, the U.S. government plus a special organization with a staff of 750, the driving force (appropriations totalling \$26 billion) and a definite initial objective — ascertaining the feasibility of an anti-missile defence system. Eureka, on the contrary, is only an attractive hypothesis."

Umberto Agnelli's brother and business partner Gianni Agnelli put it even more concisely: what is in question is a contest for admission to the "high

technology club"; for those left out of it the door to the future is closed.

This is the opinion not only of the Agnelli brothers. Within a week of the ultimatum issued at the end of May last year by Caspar Weinberger, giving sixty days' time for replying to the invitation to join in the "star wars" programme, applications piled up on the desk of the head of the government armament board, Giuseppe Piovano. At the same time Fiat, Montedison, and Finmeccanica (which is associated with the Aeritalia and Ansaldo companies) opened special consultation offices in Washington. These were instructed to extract orders at all costs from General James Abrahamson, who is in charge of the SDI project.

To put up an impressive front before the Americans, other companies formed a consortium — the CITES, which takes in the Agusta, Oto Melara, Gellie, Breda Meccanica Bresciana, Elettronica, Marconi, and SMA firms. Along with the military, they all are anxious to get the Appenine "boot" into outer space.

Washington is gratified by the abundance and zeal of applicants. But like a rich bride it is not in a hurry and prefers to pick and choose. "The Americans," the journal *Europe* observed, "are looking in Europe for something special, some definite method or a brilliant idea... The Pentagon is convinced that somewhere in Europe there is some small secret factory producing geniuses — researchers and technical experts who are inadequately utilized here — and is out to find them. It is

not interested in the industrialist as such unless he looks as 'American' as Gianni Agnelli does."

During an official visit to Rome General Abrahamson lifted the veil on what the Pentagon wants in Italy — technology involving the use of infrared rays and lasers, thermography, new materials and computers. With true Yankee bluntness the distinguished guest warned those who had an eye on a slice of the multibillion dollar pie that at the initial stage the U.S. has only crumbs to offer — minor contracts running to a total of few tens of millions of dollars. These contracts would be concluded with a narrow group of researchers working for the firms that come on top in a contest specially organized for the purpose.

The number of would-be participants immediately dropped. Of the remaining offers the Pentagon was most interested in the laser technology worked out at the CISE laboratory in Milan (the ENEL company), space technology and satellites (Aeritalia), radar devices (Selenia), infrared sensors (CITES), ceramics and the new Farbin lubricant capable of withstanding extremely high temperatures (Montedison).

While experts try the new lubricant and businessmen using radar, infrared rays and lasers are trying to estimate the dimensions of the future profits, sober-minded politicians are asking whether this drive for "star wars" profits and illusory superiority will not turn Italy, and with it the whole planet, into very real star dust.

Japan: Opposition Noted

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 24 Mar 86 pp 22-23

[Article by Y. Tsvrovsky: "Before the Rubicon"]

[Text]

When Tokyo received the "Weinberger ultimatum" in late March last year few had any doubts that the Japanese government would once again promptly snap to attention. There was a reason for this.

During his visit to the United States in the beginning of 1985 Prime Minister

Yasuhiro Nakasone had expressed his "understanding" of SDI and later, at the Bonn meeting of the Seven, he had urged support of the U.S. position. And Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe promised a reply to the ultimatum within the given time limit, though he did point to some uncertainties as regards many aspects of SDI.

In the year that has passed since then Japan's position has remained indefinite. This is giving rise to growing concern both in Washington and among the Japanese leaders who are constantly calling for "Western solidarity." Nakasone recently said that the reply cannot be postponed "endlessly." There is more and more frequent mention of the date of that reply—either mid-April, when Nakasone and Abe are to pay an official visit to Washington, or in early May, when the Seven are due to meet in Tokyo.

What the answer will be is still not altogether clear. What is clear is that political and business circles and broad sections of the public are becoming increasingly convinced that the "star wars" programme runs counter to the national interests. This is conceded even by the advocates of a positive answer who favour meeting Washington halfway in exchange for damping down on criticism of the growing imbalance of U.S.-Japanese trade and on threats of protectionist countermeasures. Others, while admitting the possibility of adverse political consequences for Japan, are apprehensive of missing out on the scientific and technological fruits of SDI research and speak of channelling to civilian branches the military technology acquired as a result of involvement in it. Still another group of advocates of Japan's participation in "star wars" hopes to put over the old act of pretending to resent American pressure while taking another step towards turning Japan into a military superpower. Moreover, this time the step must be an ambitious one and take Japan a long way towards the acquisition of an independent nuclear-missile potential.

The first set of arguments put forward by the opponents of SDI is associated with the foreign policy consequences. The Japanese Big Business mouthpiece Nihon Keizai writes: "Most likely this system will heighten international tension and increase military spending since the object is simultaneously to reinforce strategic nuclear systems and to conduct SDI research and development." And the Asahi points out: "Since the Soviet Union is bound to take countermeasures, would not a new round in the arms race become inevitable? Europe and Japan... need relaxation of tension in relations with the Soviet Union even more than the United States."

Tokyo is aware that if it becomes involved in "star wars" it would have to

share the responsibility for the resultant increase in international tension and instability and the escalation of the arms race. It also realizes that participation in SDI would work against the tendency of Japanese diplomacy to become more active and against the heightening of the country's international prestige.

Japan, as the only country to have experienced the horrors of nuclear bombing, has a special right to a say in the discussion of problems relating to nuclear disarmament. But until recently it made practically no use of that right. It was only in 1984 that Shintaro Abe submitted to the Geneva disarmament conference a proposal aimed at the total termination of underground nuclear tests. But how can this call to end the testing of nuclear weapons be reconciled with the deployment of these weapons in outer space?

The second set of arguments against joining in "star wars" is connected with the domestic political consequences of such a move. It would primarily be another blow at the Constitution, which prohibits joining with other countries in military moves. In 1969 the Japanese parliament passed a resolution limiting the exploration and use of outer space by Japan strictly to peaceful purposes. For a country the majority of whose population is subject to a painful "nuclear allergy" participation in "star wars" would signify the further erosion of the famous "three non-nuclear principles." After all, nowadays few seek to conceal the nuclear character of SDI by claiming that its purpose is to "make the nuclear weapon powerless." According to the Japan Times, a U.S. Administration spokesman told his Japanese counterparts in Tokyo that SDI is designed to strengthen rather than eliminate the present nuclear deterrence arsenal. The doubling in the draft U.S. federal budget for the coming year of spending on the nuclear component of "star wars" did not go unnoticed in Japan. Even Nakasone, speaking in parliament, had to voice disquiet over the "nuclear essence of SDI."

The fact that Japanese scientists' access to U.S. military laboratories is made conditional on adoption of draconian secrecy laws is seen by Japanese public opinion as another indication of the adverse effect of Japan's involvement in SDI on the domestic situation.

The third set of arguments relates to questions that at first glance would seem

to be purely technical. For one thing, many in Japan take a sceptical view of the whole project. A serious blow to faith in American technology was dealt by the disaster that overtook the space shuttle Challenger and shortly before that by the crash of the Boeing 747, said to be the "safer plane in the world."

Besides, the Japanese government conceded at the end of last year that "not too many companies want to take part in SDI research." Why? Firms renowned for their up-to-date and reliable consumer durables are often perfectly satisfied with their profits and prefer not to discredit themselves in the eyes of the public by getting involved in a dubious military programme. Nor do they believe in the shower of super-modern technology being promised to SDI participants.

Industrialists are also afraid the Americans will make use of SDI to break into their laboratories. Japan and Western Europe, the Japan Quarterly observed, have already outstripped the U.S. in technology and industrial power; the U.S. has retained primacy only in space research, and the "by-products" of SDI were designed only to give a spur to American industry. Japanese Big Business does not see this outlook as reassuring.

The arguments advanced by the opponents of involvement in "star wars" are weighty indeed. Nevertheless the votaries of "Western solidarity," re-

gardless of the flimsiness of their case, are doing their utmost to impel Japan on to a dubious course. The Japanese Foreign Ministry, for instance, has issued a document contending that even nuclear-powered space weapons conform to Japan's three non-nuclear principles. Before that another set of principles prohibiting the export of military technology was declared to be less important than the Japanese-American Security Treaty. The result was the conclusion of the 1983 bilateral agreement under which the latest achievements of Japanese science and technology that can be used for military purposes may be exported to the U.S. Not long ago the U.S. Administration appointed special emissaries from the air, navy, air force and the marine corps to pick out whatever they find useful in Japanese laboratories.

Which side will gain the upper hand in the controversy over involvement in "star wars"? Will Tokyo give its full support to the adventuristic project or will it choose the "West German formula" which opens the way to participation "only of private firms"? The signs are that these questions will be answered shortly. It will then be seen exactly how valid is Japan's claim to be independent in its decision-making.

/9274
CSO: 5200/1381

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

FRENCH PRESIDENT STRESSES 'AUTONOMOUS DEFENSE' POLICY

LD271254 Paris Domestic Service in French 1100 GMT 27 May 86

[Text] François Mitterrand was at Coetquidan this morning, where he met the students of the Saint-Cyr military school. Henri Guirchon, you say that the president has recalled his attachment to an autonomous French defense strategy:

[Guirchon] That is right, Dominique. In a brief 5-minute speech before officer candidates, François Mitterrand recalled that if one has to take into account the transformations, the modernizations of society, one must also remember certain values which, for their part, are permanent, such as the love, the defense, of the homeland. But, in his speech, the head of state in effect chiefly insisted on what he considers a priority for France: autonomous defense

[Begin Mitterrand recording] No one has the right of life or death over France. Our country will not allow itself to be drawn into a conflict that it has not clearly accepted. It is faithful to its alliances. It is loyal to its obligations. But it makes its own decision — alone. This prompts it to hesitate to enter — at least no more than befits a big country that is master of its acts — into mechanisms where it will not be able to take part, a whole and free part, in the decision. What I say here is true for the present strategy; it also will be true for all other strategies. [end recording]

An affirmation, or rather a confirmation by the head of state, which could concern certain recent raids, certain non-authorizations of territorial overflight; which also could concern — and this is more important — the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the SDI. In this case, it is a phrase used by the president that is addressed directly to Prime Minister Chirac, who declared last week that in his opinion, on the contrary, France would have to associate itself with the U.S. project. Therefore, this morning the president seized the opportunity to reaffirm his convictions. This little phrase was echoed by a high-ranking officer of Saint-Cyr, who recalled that student officers must be properly taught that the president is the head of the Armed Forces.

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CSO: 5200/2695

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

CONCERN VOICED OVER UPDATE OF UK RADAR STATION

Leeds YORKSHIRE POST in English 8 May 86 p 6

[Text]

PLANS to update Fylingdales early warning station in North Yorkshire could make it part of the American "Star Wars" system, a Labour councillor claimed yesterday.

Coun. Bill Birch (Scarborough) was commenting at a meeting of the North York Moors National Park Committee on proposals to replace the station's three radar "golf balls" with a 106ft. high pyramid.

The committee was angered that the plans only came to light through a Ministry of Defence letter to the environmental group Green Alliance.

It was agreed to complain to the Ministry about the lack of information and to raise questions about the "updating and change of design."

Coun. Birch said: "There is a suggestion that it could become part of the American 'Star Wars' system.

"It could be a disaster. If it were the enemy the first target would be to

knock out the Fylingdales station."

He said there was great alarm in the Scarborough area and as many questions as possible should be put to the Ministry.

President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, popularly known as Star Wars, is an idea presently being researched which aims to create a defensive shield in space to counter incoming enemy missiles.

Fylingdales forms a link in the present early warning chain administered by the U.S. with a similar station at Thule, Greenland and one in Alaska.

But Coun. Kenneth Ross (Con. Scarborough) said: "As a parent and grandfather, I would rather see the early-warning station, than be left defenceless."

He liked the new design and said he could not agree with members who said it should be sited elsewhere.

Mr. Gerald McGuire (Malton) said he obtained a copy of a letter from the Ministry to Green Alliance, of which he is a member.

The National Park officer, Mr. Derek Statham, had failed to get any information in spite of several queries to the Ministry.

Mr. McGuire said he wrote to Green Alliance which had links with Whitehall and asked casually about reports of reorganisation of Fylingdales.

"To my surprise, I got a letter all about it and a photo of a similar installation in America," he said. It was likely to go ahead and there would be an announcement soon.

Coun. Ralph Andrew (Lib. Northallerton) said decisions would be made over their heads and he was concerned at the Ministry's treatment of Mr. Statham.

The committee chairman, Coun. Martin Territt (Con. Hovingham) said this was not a matter under discussion.

The committee agreed that Coun. Territt should write to the Ministry complaining about the lack of official information and raise questions about the siting, employment, design, colour and electro-magnetic radiation, and whether a site outside the National Park was possible.

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CSO: 5240/048

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

SPANISH DEFENSE MINISTER QUESTIONS SDI ROLE

LD281134 Madrid in Spanish to Europe 1000 GMT 28 May 86

[Text] Spanish Defense Minister Narciso Serra questioned the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative plan — better known as "star wars" — in his closing address at the working session held in Madrid this week by the Foundation of Peace Studies and International Relations. Serra said it is difficult to believe that this program is a positive element in the balance of the transatlantic dialogue or in the balance of payments between the United States and Europe in the defense sphere.

The Spanish executive has not made any announcement on Spain's possible participation in the plan so far, while awaiting the report being drafted by an interministerial committee.

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CSO: 5200/2694

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

AKHROMEYEV, ZAMYATIN, KORNIYENKO FEBRUARY NEWS CONFERENCE

JD012150 Moscow TASS in English 2143 GMT 1 Mar 86

[Text] Moscow, 1 March TASS--"The Soviet program for ensuring peace and security" is the subject of a news conference that was held in the Press Center of the 27th Congress of the CPSU on Friday. The speakers at the news conference were: Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, and Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

Matters related to the foreign policy activities of the communist party and the Soviet state are dealt with in detail in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the congress, delivered by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as during the discussion of the report, said Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy USSR foreign minister. The cornerstone of these activities, is the provision made by V.I. Lenin and reiterated in the new edition of the CPSU program that the historical dispute between the two opposing systems into which the world is divided can and should be resolved by means of peaceful competition, and not by military means.

Accordingly, the chief aim of the foreign policy of the CPSU always was and remains to give the Soviet people the possibility to work in the conditions of lasting peace. However, it is not only the Soviet, but all other peoples as well, that need a lasting peace. Peace is an indispensable condition for social progress in general, and today it is even more than that—it is a matter of human survival.

Now that people have come to control means of self-destruction, the Soviet Union considers it a paramount task to stop material preparations for nuclear war, to turn around the arms race on earth and to prevent it from spreading into outer space. And to eliminate nuclear weapons totally and everywhere by the end of this century.

Regrettably, the response which came the other day from the American side to the nuclear disarmament program proposed by the Soviet Union can in no way be considered constructive, as was pointed out at the congress. Conversely, it shows that the U.S. leadership intends to continue spurring on the arms race on earth and spreading it into outer space in a bid to secure military superiority.

The continuous escalation of the level of armed confrontation is by no means a way to peace, as President Reagan claims. If the arms arsenals keep swelling, even parity ensures at best equal danger rather than equal security. In the age of nuclear missiles the genuine security of states is only possible as security for all.

Even in the past--in the prewar period and after the war--the Soviet Union gave preference to ideas of collective security but today, according to our profound conviction, it is not merely a preferential but the only possible way of ensuring lasting peace.

This explains why our party has raised the question of developing a comprehensive system of international security, the military, political, economic and humanitarian foundations of which are presented in the political report. These foundations could become a starting point and provide a framework for a direct and regular dialogue among the leaders of the countries of the world community, both bilateral and multilateral. The idea was also put forward in this context that the leaders of the five states, the permanent members of the Security Council, sit down to discuss what can be done to safeguard and strengthen peace.

President Reagan's reply to the Soviet proposals, as well as his address to the nation 2 days ago, which is in fact an addition to his reply, show that the United States is continuing the same course as before, a course that gives priority to military strength as the method of resolving outstanding issues, Leonid Zamyatin said at the press conference.

He said that the U.S. proposals are being studied with due account for the additional explanations given by the American delegation in Geneva. On the whole, Leonid Zamyatin said, comparing President Reagan's two latest statements, one can say already now that the U.S. response to the Soviet proposals is not constructive. It is lopsided, and, in fact, is turned in the opposite direction to the proposals advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in his 15 January statement.

While declaring his commitment to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, Reagan does not give a precise concrete programme for attaining this objective. On the contrary, he links it with numerous reservations, conditions and the possibility of resolving questions only from the position of strength. The American reply does not contain a solution to the fundamental issue of preventing the arms race in outer space. The American "star wars" programme is pronounced to be inviolable, and, therefore, restrictions on the development of strike space arms are not to be included in an agreement.

As to strategic nuclear armaments, the old American proposals are restated on which the Soviet Union has already commented. If such proposals were materialized, the United States would get a more than two-fold superiority in nuclear warheads. In that case, the USSR would have to dismantle the structure of its strategic nuclear forces and build them anew according to an American pattern.

On medium-range missiles, Leonid Zamyatin went on to say, we are offered the so-called zero option which the Soviet Union rejected earlier because it would

enable the United States to retain what it would like to retain in its armaments. Indeed, what is the difference between the new "zero option" and the previous "zero options" proposed by Reagan? The United States simply suggests now that it be protracted for a period of 3 years, but the essence is the same: to gain unilateral advantages. The United States officially stated its negative position to a nuclear weapon test ban, by implying that as long as nuclear weapons remain an element of deterrence, the United States should continue the tests. It is equally difficult to detect in the American reply at least a fraction of constructiveness on chemical weapons, just as on the Vienna talks and the Stockholm conference.

Besides, the question of security is arbitrarily linked to regional conflicts and some other questions that are in no way related to the problem of ending the race of armaments and eliminating nuclear weapons.

It is clear that if the United States insists on this stance, on such unacceptable proposals, this road will not lead to the search for compromise solutions. On the contrary, it will push the problem into an impasse from which it is hard to find a way out.

The U.S. response, noted First Deputy Minister of the USSR Georgiy Korniyenko, does not in the least advance the Geneva talks.

The chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR dismissed as "absurd" the figures cited by the U.S. president on 26 February about Soviet military spending. According to those figures, the Soviet Union in the past 15 years spent 50 percent of its budget on military needs.

This is absurd, he commented. No state can afford spending so much on military needs in peacetime. This is an unconscientious calculation and I don't know whose fault it was, the president's or his aides'.

The U.S. president claimed, Marshal Akhromeyev went on to say, that the Soviet Union has 5 times as many tanks and 11 times as many artillery pieces as the United States. This calculation is also unconscientious. When speaking about conventional arms, one should take the alignment of military forces between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. And this alignment is utterly different from what the president claimed. As far as the number of divisions is concerned, the correlation is as follows: 94 for NATO and 78 for the Warsaw Treaty countries. Besides, the numerical strength of a division in NATO is significantly larger than that of one in a Warsaw Treaty country. And when speaking about the USSR and the United States, one should give consideration first of all to the correlation of forces in the field of strategic arms, where, and the Pentagon admits this, there is a rough balance. "Generally, we don't think that the president should engage in such calculations," Marshal Akhromeyev said. "For we could also say for our part that the United States has 15 aircraft-carriers, while we have none. [Quotations marks as received]

It should also be pointed out that 1,500 warplanes are deployed there, and about 800 of them can carry nuclear weapons. The strength of the U.S. Marines exceeds ours by 14 times.

As for the approach formulated by the U.S. president in his speech, this is an approach of power pressure, of a further arms race.

Despite the pressure exerted by public opinion, despite the appeals of statesmen from many countries, the United States has not given a positive answer to the appeal of the Soviet Union to join the moratorium on all the types of nuclear tests, said Leonid Zamyatin, head of the International Information Department of the CPSU Central Committee, answering the question of a Nigerian correspondent.

The Soviet Union has instituted a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests on more than one occasion. It was done on 6 August, last year, then on 15 January. The moratorium expires on 31 March. The Soviet Union spared no effort for making the U.S. realize that it was one of the real steps capable of holding up the modernization of nuclear weapons and setting the beginning of the nuclear disarmament process.

Despite all this, the U.S. president said that while nuclear weapons existed the United States was going to continue their improvement.

In these conditions the necessity arises for the Soviet side to consider the question: can we postpone unilaterally our measures while the U.S. nuclear weapons directed against us are being improved, even more so, since in a series of those tests some components of space weapons are being mastered, can we prolong our moratorium on nuclear tests indefinitely? We cannot disregard either our own security interests, or the security interests of our allies.

The Soviet side recognizes as an unshakeable principle the recognition of the security interests of all the states, the respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev said.

We urge to conclude an agreement on giving up the use of force or the threat of its use and regard as impermissible the actions of any state or a group of states aimed at attaining unilateral military advantages. It was reiterated from the rostrum of the 27th CPSU Congress that the wise attitude consisted not in taking care exclusively of oneself, especially at the expense of the other side, but in seeking equal security, Sergey Akhromeyev stressed.

The U.S. pursues a different line. The official doctrine of Washington is based on retaliation, on intimidation. This leads to the arms race and justifies a course towards military superiority. This doctrine undermines the security of states and actually turns the whole world into a nuclear hostage.

One cannot count exclusively on force, the way it is done by some people in the United States, Georgiy Korniyenko, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, said. This is why the striving to achieve success in the sphere of disarmament is the main direction of the Soviet foreign policy, which was vividly manifested in the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress.

The Soviet Union is ready for another Soviet-American summit meeting, which, as the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev said in

the political report, would be really oriented towards a practical solution of political problems, and would not be a mere protocol event, Leonid Zamyatin said. If this meeting can be used for developing the Geneva accords, for turning them into practical political agreements on major military and other international problems, we are ready for it at any time when the proper conditions are created.

In short, we favour a constructive meeting, Leonid Zamyatin stressed. This is what our stand consists in.

The Soviet Union stands for a collective search for a settlement in the Middle East, Georgiy Korniyenko. The latest developments in the region just illustrate the futility of separate deals, against which the Soviet Union has warned on more than one occasion.

Answering a question from a Kuwaiti correspondent, Korniyenko stressed that by its entire policy on the Middle East in general and on the Lebanese question in particular, the USSR had done everything it could, including at the United Nations, to ensure the prompt withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon and also from other Arab lands. As for the tripartite agreement in Lebanon, Korniyenko said, we wholeheartedly wish an end to the civil war in that country, wish to see Lebanon a united, sovereign and territorially integral state. It is our conviction that it is entirely up to Lebanon itself to find practical ways to this goal.

The problem of medium-range missiles in the European zone, despite its complexity, is easier to resolve than the problem of medium-range missiles in the East, said Marshal Akhromeyev. It is easier because confronting each other in the European zone are medium-range systems of the USSR and the United States. Also positioned there are similar systems of Great Britain and France.

In the east, the question is more difficult. In the Pacific zone, the United States maintains up to seven aircraft-carriers. Roughly speaking, these are 350 nuclear weapon delivery vehicles with a range of up to 1,500 kilometres threatening Soviet territory. These are U.S. strategic aircraft deployed on Guam, these are American systems positioned in Japan, South Korea.

We hear nothing from the United States on this issue but the demand that this problem be handled simultaneously with the problem of the European zone, Marshal Akhromeyev said. We agree, but let us decide what to do with American systems deployed in the Far East. There is so far no response to that from the American side.

The question of the Soviet Union's recognition of the present government of the Philippines does not arise. The USSR maintained and maintains now relations with the Philippines as a state, said First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR Georgiy Korniyenko.

The Soviet Union, he said, proceeds from the premise that the change of the government in that country is the business of its people. The USSR always sticks to the practice of establishing relations with a state, not with one or another government. And it is up to each people what government to have.

On Afghanistan, Marshal Akhromeyev said that outside interference in that country's internal affairs is expanding. Earlier on, foreign aid to counter-revolutionary Afghan gangs stood at hundreds of millions of dollars, while at present, it is estimated at billions. The United States and some other countries spend roughly 1.5 billion dollars on aid to Afghan counter-revolution. This money keeps operational about 150 gangs, and was used to set up numerous camps on Pakistani territory to train bandits who are then sent into Afghanistan. The Soviet Union already stated that if interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs ceases, if countries concerned adopt an official pledge on this account, and if guarantees are given on its non-resumption, the limited contingent of Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

The CPSU Central Committee's political report to the 27th Congress, added Georgiy Korniyenko, clearly defines our principled position in Afghanistan. It says that we have coordinated with the Afghan government a time-table for a withdrawal of Soviet troops, and gives reasons why this plan is not being set into motion.

As far as we know, talks on political settlement conducted between Pakistan and Afghanistan through the UN secretary-general's personal representative, have advanced rather far. But precisely at a time when the sides began moving towards the final stage of the talks, the hand of those who are hindering Pakistan's advancement towards a political settlement made itself felt.

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CSO: 1812/102

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET JOURNAL DETAILS GORBACHEV 15 JANUARY PROPOSAL

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 4, Apr 86 pp 12-22

[Article by A. Sovetov: "Complete Elimination of Nuclear Weapons--The Soviet Programme"]

[Text] In his statement of January 15 this year Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, outlined a strategy for peace designed to rid the Earth of all nuclear weapons until the end of this century, to deliver mankind from the threat of nuclear holocaust and ensure a peaceful future for it.

There is no task more noble and urgent today. In its advance mankind has reached unprecedented heights and the potential of knowledge and experience it has accumulated has offered opportunities for rapid social progress. At the same time, human genius is used by imperialism for creating weapons of enormous destructive power. The policy pursued by the imperialists, who are prepared to sacrifice the destiny of whole nations, is increasing the danger of the arms race spilling over into outer space, of new weapons being employed.

"The most acute problem facing mankind is that of war and peace," reads the new edition of the Programme of the CPSU. "Imperialism was responsible for two world wars that claimed tens of millions of lives. It is creating the threat of a third world war."

Twice in the 20th century the militarists pushed mankind into the abyss of world war. In both cases people were faced with the dilemma: peace or carnage. And in both cases the forces of militarism overwhelmed the forces of reason. Today, an entirely new threat is confronting mankind and it has to choose between peace and the death of the human race, an end to the world civilisation. In this situation it has become more imperative than ever that statesmen, the public at large, and every individual should realistically assess the process going on in the world and draw the appropriate conclusions, and see their role in the efforts to prevent the world from sliding down to another war.

The Soviet Union has drawn such a conclusion. It believes that the world needs a turn for the better. Being aware of this, the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government have adopted a decision on a number of major foreign policy actions of a fundamental nature. "They are designed", reads the Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, "to promote to a maximum degree an improvement in the international situation. They are prompted by the need to overcome the negative confrontational trends that have been growing in recent years and to clear the way to curbing the nuclear arms race on Earth and preventing it in outer space, to an overall reduction of the risk of war, and

to the building of confidence as an integral part of relations among states."

The Statement offers a set of new proposals encompassing all the main areas of foreign policy activities for the benefit of disarmament, for lessening world tensions and providing better prospects for a peaceful future and progress of all nations.

The chief proposal is the concrete programme, scheduled for a precisely defined period until the end of this century, and envisaging large-scale measures aimed at a complete and total elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union has proposed that at the first stage, within the next 5 to 8 years, the USSR and the USA, mutually renouncing the development, testing and deployment of space weapons, would cut by half the nuclear arms capable of reaching each other's territory. On the remaining delivery vehicles of this kind each side will retain no more than 6,000 warheads.

At this stage, all the Soviet and American medium-range missiles in the European zone, both ballistic and cruise missiles, are to be eliminated as a first step to rid the European continent of nuclear weapons. The USA would assume an obligation not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries, while Britain and France would not build up their relevant nuclear arms. It is necessary that from the start the USA and the USSR agree to stop all nuclear explosions and call upon other nuclear states to join the moratorium.

The second stage is to begin no later than 1990 and to last for 5 to 7 years. During these years, nuclear disarmament would be joined by the other nuclear powers. In this period the USSR and the USA would continue the arms reductions agreed upon during the first stage and also carry out further measures designed to eliminate their medium-range nuclear weapons, freeze their tactical nuclear systems. Following the completion by the USSR and the USA of the 50 per cent reduction in their relevant arms at the second stage, another radical step is to be taken: all nuclear powers will eliminate their tactical nuclear arms.


At the second stage, the Soviet-American understanding on the prohibition of space strike weapons should become multilateral, with the obligatory participation in it of major industrial powers. All nuclear powers would stop nuclear weapon tests. Simultaneously, the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, whose destructive capacity is close to that of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction would be prohibited.

The third stage should begin not later than 1995. By the end of 1999, no nuclear weapon . . . remain on Earth. Moreover, a universal agreement is to be drawn up to prevent such weapons from being revived in future.

The new Soviet proposals, however broad their scope, are specific and practicable. This was noted immediately by many bourgeois news media. A West German magazine proposed that the Soviet initiatives be accepted as "a comprehensive universal and thoroughly elaborated, in time and content, working plan"¹ of eliminating nuclear weapons.

¹ See *Der Spiegel*, Jan. 20, 1986.

**The Soviet Proposal
on the Programs of the Complete Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Throughout the World by the Year 2000**



True, the meaning of the Statement is often deliberately distorted in the Western press. It is stressed in the Statement that the reduction of strategic weapons is only possible if the development, testing and deployment of space strike weapons are banned. Some people in the West are trying to present this condition as "linkage" of sorts, that is, employment of the method constantly used by the United States in its foreign-policy activity, while others began even to speak of a "Soviet ultimatum". What is evident is the deliberate distortion of the truth. The Statement says not about "linkage" but about the objective logical interrelationship which cannot be broken because of the Pentagon's plans envisaging a first strike from behind a "space shield".

It is also quite obvious that the development of a new type of weapons and their deployment in outer space can open a way to an elimination of nuclear weapons, though the US Administration spokesmen are trying to convince the nations it can. On the contrary, this will create a situation in which, as was noted in a recent message by the USSR Supreme Soviet to the US Congress, the arms race "will grow unprecedentedly and take most dangerous turns". But to prevent the arms race from spilling over into outer space means to lift a barrier to large-scale reductions of nuclear arms. This is precisely why the Soviet Union, although its material and intellectual potential enables it to produce any weapons, proposes, as it did at the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly last year, that any space militarisation programmes be dropped and that mankind concentrate on extensive exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes to ensure progress for the entire world and reliable security for all.

The new Soviet Programme also provides for effective verification of all measures that are to relieve the nations of the heavy burden of armaments and to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. Naturally, verification details are yet to be discussed and agreed upon. The Soviet Union—and this is of fundamental importance—insists that verification with regard to the weapons that are to be destroyed or limited would be carried out both by national technical means and with the help of international procedures, including on-site inspection whenever necessary. The USSR is ready to reach agreement on any additional verification measures. This convincingly disproves the thesis being spread by imperialist politicians and propaganda that the Soviet Union is a "closed society" that will never allow any verification and, therefore, one should not trust Moscow's disarmament proposals, for they are a "trap" for the West. The absurdity of this allegation has become most obvious now.

The USSR has demonstrated its constructive approach to the programme of eliminating nuclear weapons and its wish to place it on a practical basis by yet another important decision—to extend by three months its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions (its term had expired on December 31, 1985) and again proposed that the United States join the moratorium.

It is certainly no accident that a considerable part of the new Soviet initiatives directly concern Europe. If Soviet and American medium-range missiles were eliminated from our continent, without mixing and overburdening this matter with other problems, it would untie perhaps one of the most complicated knots in current world politics, and the path to a radical reduction in nuclear arms and to their complete elimination would be cleared to a considerable extent.

Parallel with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, the Soviet Union also thinks it possible fully to eliminate by that year such barbaric weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons, and to take effective measures to reduce armed forces and conventional arms. To that end, all the talks now under way should be activated and

the disarmament mechanisms in Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna made most effective. In this way the dangerous tendency when the rate of the arms race exceeds the rate of progress at the talks would be overcome.

The implementation of the programme of eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of this century would also bring the security in Asia to a qualitatively new level and contribute to a search, together with all Asian countries, for an overall comprehensive approach to establishing a system of secure and durable peace on this largest continent with the biggest population.

No state has ever proposed such a detailed and comprehensive programme whose implementation would block all ways to stepping up the arms race. It has set the goal of establishing a new approach to disarmament problems in international relations and calls for abandoning, as the Statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee reads, the thinking of the Stone Age, when the chief concern was to have a bigger stick or a heavier stone. With such a mentality military rivalry can become an avalanche and any control over the course of events can be impossible. The new Soviet proposals precisely open the way to a radical improvement of the international situation and provide for security to all nations.

Such an approach of the Soviet Union to the prospects of international development has been adopted by the Soviet Union not because, as is sometimes alleged in the West, it is "scared" by the escalation of the arms race by the United States, especially by its space plans. This approach is motivated, above all, by the high sense of responsibility for the destinies of the world, for the destinies of all nations. The USSR sees its duty in using all the prestige of socialism and every opportunity this system offers for tipping the balance in favour of peace and turning international developments in a direction along which mankind could enter the third millennium in a situation of equal and reliable security for all.

The Statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee is a logical continuation of the principled policy pursued consistently by Soviet Communists and all Soviet people, a policy based on the wish to deliver mankind from the fear of destruction in a nuclear conflagration. The proposals it contains have once again clearly demonstrated the most typical features of Soviet foreign policy—its initiative and consistent nature.

It is appropriate to recall in this context that the Soviet Union was the first country in the world to advance practical proposals on elaborating measures on the general reduction of armaments way back at the Genoa Conference in 1922 and proposed the convocation of the first ever international conference on disarmament, which was held that same year. The Soviet government then proposed a concrete plan for cutting back the numerical strength of the armies of the countries taking part in that Conference. In 1925, the Soviet Union was among the first to sign the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and in the late 1920s and early 1930s it tabled a draft convention on general, complete and immediate disarmament and then a draft convention on arms reduction at the preparatory commission of the World Disarmament Conference and at the Conference itself.

The Leninist course towards general disarmament, of which the destruction of nuclear weapons is a major component today, was continued by the Soviet Union after the Second World War. It tabled at the United Nations, as early as 1946, a draft international convention envisaging an

obligation not to use atomic weapons under any circumstances, to forbid their production and storage, and to destroy all the manufactured and unfinished atomic weapons available at that time. But, it will be recalled, the United States rejected that draft in the hope of securing for itself nuclear arms monopoly as a means of world domination. As a result, the world was drawn in the escalation of nuclear armaments.

Though the USSR, in order to build up its defence capacity and to defend the fraternal socialist countries, was compelled to create nuclear weapons of its own, throughout the period that followed it continued to insist on the need to stop the buildup of nuclear arsenals and find an immediate solution to the nuclear disarmament problem.

The struggle against the threat of a nuclear holocaust, for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons has always been central to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The key item of these proposals, which have been put forward by the USSR at the UN and during the bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Western countries, is the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear arms to be followed by their destruction, by their removal from the arsenals of all states. The same idea is behind the Soviet efforts to solve in a most radical way the nuclear problem through a complete and unreserved rejection of these monstrous weapons of mass destruction, and the USSR carries on a persistent struggle also for individual, partial measures to restrict the nuclear arms race in all directions wherever it may be possible: a limitation and reduction of strategic arms, clearing Europe of nuclear weapons, a general and complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, the non-proliferation of these weapons, a nuclear arms freeze, the creation of nuclear-free zones, and so on.

Furthermore, demonstrating its desire for peace and a high sense of responsibility for the destiny of nations, the USSR assumed in 1982 a unilateral commitment to refrain from first use of nuclear weapons; in 1983, also unilaterally, it imposed a moratorium on launching antisatellite weapons; in 1985, on deploying medium-range missiles in Europe; and finally, in that same year, on nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet initiatives served as an impetus which helped to begin talks on many aspects of disarmament, bilateral—between the USSR and the USA—and multilateral. It is the purposeful political course of the USSR towards achieving tangible results in winding down the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race, that made it possible to reach several major understandings aimed at slowing down the arms race, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the Soviet-US Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-1), the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT-2), and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

By contrast, the USA has, throughout the postwar period, invariably launched new rounds of the nuclear arms race and thought it possible that these arms could be used, though, of course, its political leaders did not stint peaceful assurance, nor do they now. In fact, *Washington has always been the first to start developing a new generation of weapons* at every turning point in the nuclear arms buildup: the testing of the atom bomb, and then the hydrogen bomb, the manufacture of heavy strategic bombers, atomic artillery, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and so on.

Ever since nuclear weapons have appeared, the USSR has never, under no circumstances, threatened to use them, while the USA has issued such threats more than once. It has long been an open secret that US politi-

cians and brass hats calculated right after the war on how many Soviet cities nuclear bombs should be dropped in order to fulfil the insane plans for "rolling back communism" and contemplated in earnest the possibility of using nuclear weapons during the events in Korea and Indochina, the way they were used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Each time a resolution or a declaration was being adopted at the United Nations, reflecting the growing concern of world public opinion over the arms race escalation, especially the nuclear arms buildup, and the demand was clearly expressed that a world nuclear catastrophe be averted—the Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons for All Time (1972), the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe (1981), the declaration condemning nuclear war (1983) and a number of other documents—the USA has invariably been with the minority, among those who voted against them.

It is due to the USA that the disarmament negotiations were stuck for years and in a number of instances the talks, which had started earlier, were disrupted, while many understandings reached after a long search for mutually acceptable solutions, the search which sometimes continued for years, as was the case with the SALT-2 Treaty, have never been legislatively formalised by the American side.

Doctrines and concepts envisaging the admissibility of nuclear war ("limited", "protracted", etc.) were produced in the USA one after another. They increased the probability of war, because on their basis the directives were drawn up whose chief aim was to achieve US military superiority, to upset the approximate Soviet-American military parity and thus to disturb stability in the world. All these doctrines and practical measures were based on the concept of a first, disarming, strike.

The unrestrained military preparations plans culminated in the "star wars" doctrine advanced by the present Republican Administration. One of its most vicious aspects is that the so-called strategic defense initiative (SDI) added to the aggressiveness of the military-industrial complex which is suggesting to the Americans "thoughts about the unthinkable", that is, about the admissibility of nuclear war and the possibility of victory in it. For this reason the Heritage Foundation, the brain trust of the ultra-right circles in the USA, has been importunately reiterating in its recent publications on "star wars" problems the idea that a nuclear war can be won if the USA is able to protect itself with a space shield from Soviet missiles.

The US ruling elite is now pulling all strings in a bid to make the economy and science, too, work for the "star wars" plans. It has been estimated that the spending on the SDI will run into one trillion dollars by the end of this century. To finance these plans the Administration is reducing drastically the spending on social needs, which, as the well-known American physician Benjamin Spock justly noted, dooms millions of Americans to poverty and leaves "millions more in hopeless despair". Benjamin Spock is convinced that such steps "will push the National Debt so astronomically high that the US would self-destruct economically long before Star Wars ever gets off the ground".

Today, the world has come to a dangerous point at which the arms race can spill over into outer space, which spells unprecedented menace to all people on Earth. Even experienced persons having a good knowledge of history, such as former US Ambassador to the USSR George Kennan, now a well-known historian, who, incidentally had put into circulation the idea of "containing" the Soviet Union, have arrived at the conclusion that it is the United States that is to be contained. "There is much in our own life, here in this country, that needs early containment.

It could, in fact, be said that the first thing we Americans need to learn to contain is, in some ways, ourselves." ²

It is this containment that the US Administration lacks. "In implementing the 'star wars' programme," said Mikhail Gorbachev in an interview to the newspaper *L'Humanité*, "Washington, in fact, deliberately aims to thwart the current talks and erase all the existing arms limitation agreements. In this case, the USSR and the United States, their allies, the entire world would find themselves, as early as in the forthcoming years, in a situation of totally uncontrolled arms race, strategic chaos, the most dangerous disruption of stability, general uncertainty and fear, and the enhanced risk of catastrophe linked to that."

By adopting new "super-weapons" and the "wonder technology" the USA wants to ensure absolute security for itself, while placing others in a position of "absolute danger". Space militarisation can bring about a situation in which decision-making will have to be handed over to computers and robots, thus making mankind hostage of the machines, and therefore, of technical breakdowns and faults. How far dangerous this is has been shown by the recent tragedy of the American spacecraft Challenger.

By contrast with the US concept of security based on the SDI, the Soviet concept ensures equal security for all to be achieved by arms reduction and disarmament, with the ultimate goal of totally eliminating all types of mass destruction weapons.

So, the new Soviet peace initiatives clearly demonstrate that the course of socialism is diametrically opposite to the antipopular and venturesome line of US imperialism on the world scene. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union approved at its 27th Congress the Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986-1990 and for the Period Ending in 2000, the document whose peaceful content gives the lie to the assertions of reactionary propaganda about the "aggressiveness" of socialism and about a "Soviet military threat". Meanwhile, the leaders of the much vaunted "free society" are charting the main directions of "development" till the end of this century, clearly proceeding from the interests of the military-industrial complex, giving priority to continued military preparations.

Our new proposals", reads the Statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "are addressed to the whole world". And the world has responded to them. It would be no exaggeration to say there was a general sigh of relief and hope. "The programme of disarmament, development and peace for the whole of mankind"—this is how the Statement was characterised by the Bulgarian newspaper *Rabotnichesko Delo*.

Politicians and parties, spokesmen of parliaments and municipalities, trade-union, women's, youth, religious and other public organisations, scientists, workers in culture, and leaders of diverse trends in antiwar and antinuclear movements have noted the timely, bold, humane and constructive character of the new Soviet moves. The Statement, writes *The New York Times*, makes one aware of the new dynamism of the Soviet Union. Though the Soviet Union had called for complete disarmament before, the paper says, this time it imparted to the idea a new force, and offered a concrete timetable, which apparently means a serious approach to this major problem of our time. "We," said the Japanese news-

² *Newsday*, Jan. 12, 1986.

paper *Tokyo Shimbun*, "welcome the new Soviet proposals. The fact that the Soviet leader named specific dates of complete elimination of nuclear arms is of an epoch-making significance."

The new Soviet proposals were met with enthusiastic approval in socialist countries and in developing states. Many Western countries, too, published statements in which they in one way or another approved the new Soviet initiatives and said they should be "studied fully and thoroughly". This idea was expressed, for instance, by a spokesman of the British Foreign Office. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the FRG, described the Soviet proposals as "something substantially new".

The US President declared he was "encouraged" by the Soviet proposals, and added that this was perhaps the first time that anyone proposed that nuclear weapons should be really destroyed. But Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger hastened to stress that the President's adherence to the SDI and the significance the USA attached to it were widely known. Nothing has changed in that, he stressed.

The peoples of the world expect from the US leadership not answers which are, in fact, confrontational, but a display of a political will for constructive cooperation in solving the priority problems put forward by the Soviet Union. The US Administration declared in the past its adherence to the idea of liquidating nuclear weapons. Now the Soviet Union is offering it an opportunity of doing this not in word but in deed. And it is important that no time be wasted, that the new Soviet ideas not be drowned in a quagmire of all kinds of questions, doubts and evasions of answers to the clear-cut proposals. In the capitals of Western powers there are enough experienced experts who can properly assess the proposals and give their comprehensive conclusions. During a talk with Andrei Gromyko in Moscow, former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said that from his point of view the US Administration should give a detailed answer, item by item, so that businesslike talks could begin. Though no government in the West expressed a negative response to the new Soviet moves, the leaders of states cannot afford to be slow in adopting their own decisions on them, or to delay actions on preventing a nuclear disaster.

The Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, no doubt, imparted fresh force to the debate, growing most acute at times, on issues of war and peace, on curbing the arms race and improving relations with the socialist world, the debate which has long been going on in the countries of the capitalist West (in the USA above all). The debate is being joined by ever broader sections of the public. Indeed, the course towards confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries increasingly runs counter to the national interests of the capitalist countries themselves, setting off protests among the progressive forces, and comes up against mounting resistance on the part of more realistic-minded sections of the bourgeoisie. Precisely these sentiments had their impact on the White House as it agreed to holding the Soviet-US summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985. The US reactionaries, by contrast, are taking actions obviously designed for kindling enmity and distrust, for reviving confrontation, this antipode of detente, and spreading pessimistic views with regard to the prospects of Soviet-American relations and the possibility of their improvement and development on principles of mutual benefit.

Nevertheless, the increasing number of people in the United States recall the time when both powers reached a required level of trust and concord to make a tangible contribution to the elaboration and adoption of international and bilateral documents aimed at limiting the buildup of arms, nuclear arms above all, in the world. For instance, ex-President Richard Nixon writes in the book *Real Peace*: "We will continue to have political differences that will drive us apart. We must also recognise,

however, that the United States and the Soviet Union have two common interests that can draw us together. As the world's two greatest military powers, we both want to avoid a major war that neither of us would survive. As the world's two major economic powers—each with enormous resources and capable people—we can cooperate in ways that could benefit both of us immensely."³

A similar idea, in fact, was expressed by George Kennan, who wrote after the Geneva summit that "it is entirely clear that Soviet leaders do not want a war with us and are not planning to initiate one.... We are going to have to learn to take as the basis for our calculations, a much more penetrating and sophisticated view of that particular country than the one that has become embedded in much of our public rhetoric.... We are going to have to recognise that a large proportion of the sources of our troubles and dangers lies... within ourselves."⁴

In the political life in the United States ever greater prominence is given to the problem of making the government stop the underground tests of nuclear weapons which are needed by the military mostly for fulfilling space militarisation plans within the SDI framework. Speaking about these plans, Ronald Dellums, a senior member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Research and Development, says: "In advocating the expansion of the arms race into a new technological arena, the administration risks losing what may well be the final opportunity for the nuclear superpowers to negotiate their way back from the brink of nuclear annihilation. Too often in the past the US has relied on the illusion of its technological superiority, however transitory, to forge new frontiers in the escalation of the nuclear arms race. To continue on this wrong-headed path is to accelerate the timetable for our mutual destruction. The time to act with responsible and peaceful creativity is now."⁵

No wonder, then, that, as can be seen from US press reports, letters and telegrams from public organisations and individual US citizens demanding a positive answer to the Soviet proposals and an immediate joining of the moratorium on all nuclear explosions, were received by the White House right after the Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev was published. Many organs of news media in the West express the opinion that the US President found himself in a tight corner after the USSR challenged his main argument on which the SDI is based—that a space "shield" is the best way of removing the nuclear war threat.⁶ As a result, an American weekly writes: "Reagan is caught in a public relations bind".⁷

In this situation, the opponents of the new Soviet moves, clearly afraid of being in isolation, do not venture to reject them outright, but prefer a tactics of reservations. They pretend to back the idea of constructive talks with the Soviet Union and admit in words that the Soviet proposals "deserve serious attention", but at the same time they display an obvious unwillingness to heed the call for joining the USSR-announced moratorium on all nuclear explosions, and keep insisting on carrying out the "star wars" programme. Some organs of news media are trying to prove that the Soviet plan of nuclear disarmament can allegedly add to the tensions in relations between the USA and its European allies, for

³ Richard Nixon, *Real Peace*, Boston-Toronto, 1984, p. 16.

⁴ *Newsday*, Jan. 12, 1986.

⁵ *Daily World*, Oct. 24, 1985.

⁶ *The New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1986.

⁷ *Time*, Jan. 27, 1986.

whom it could be "fatal" because, it is alleged, without the nuclear component NATO would become an "empty shell" and Western Europe would be confronted with the superior non-nuclear forces of the USSR. Pierre Lellouche, Associate Director of the French Institute of International Relations, even said in the *Newsweek* magazine that a rejection of nuclear weapons "can only make Europe 'safe' for a total conventional war."⁸

The idea is being spread that the elimination of nuclear weapons can allegedly almost destabilise the situation on whole continents. In a world without nuclear weapons, writes *The New York Times*, "the man with one bomb would be king" and a country which would acquire such weapons would come up to the level of a superpower.⁹ This reasoning shows once again that some Western politicians and journalists are obviously incapable of thinking in a new way, which is strongly demanded by the nuclear age and by the momentous tasks facing mankind, the tasks of liquidating nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union did not expect, of course, the implementation of its proposals to be all that simple. There are quite many opponents of disarmament and they resort to most sophisticated tricks to deceive the peoples and put up insuperable barriers in the way to solving this most burning problem.

And still, one has every reason to say that the Soviet proposals take the wind out of those who wish to line their pockets by continuing the arms race, even if it would bring an irreparable catastrophe to mankind, and discourage those who stick to the utopian dream of world domination, who still harbour illusions that the progress of mankind can be stopped.

The main thing now is that a recognition by the West, especially the USA, of the importance of the peace proposals would be followed by practical actions as soon as possible. The peoples have every right to hope that the coming period will not be marred by relapses into cold war, that it will see major practical understandings reached on ending the arms race and safeguarding peace.

The goals of the Soviet programme—to save life on Earth—are most noble and humane. Its implementation would offer favourable conditions for solving global and national problems. Deliverance of mankind from weaponry will help speed up the social and economic development of all countries and make it possible to win the war against the age-old enemies of humanity—backwardness, hunger, disease, illiteracy, and others.

Historical optimism has been characteristic of the CPSU, the Soviet state, and all Soviet people. The new edition of the Programme of the CPSU says that, "however grave the threat to peace posed by the policy of the aggressive circles of imperialism, world war is not fatally inevitable. It is possible to avert war and to save mankind from catastrophe. This is the historical mission of socialism, of all the progressive and peace-loving forces of the world".

The Soviet strategy of peace says that the solution to the cardinal problems of the end of the 20th century must not be put off or delayed. The present-day world situation leaves too little time to solve them. Therefore, the Soviet Union declares: the situation as it is today is complex and dangerous, but tomorrow it may be still more complex and more dan-

⁸ *Newsweek*, Feb. 3, 1986.

⁹ See *The New York Times*, Jan. 19, 1986.

gerous. However, the Soviet people believes that the world can be delivered from the threat of nuclear war, that it can get rid of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. To achieve that, there must be political will and preparedness to start, right now, the search for a solution to the problem marking the life of the present generation.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET JOURNAL: U.S. STANCE THREATENS EUROPE

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[Article by A. Grigoryants: "Europe—Our Common Home"]

[Text]

The centuries-old history of Europe has left a fabulous legacy to the peoples of the continent. This is not a mere accumulation of riches as in the tale of Aladdin and His Magic Lamp, but wealth that fills our life with deep and meaningful content and continues to add to the common treasure of the peoples of Europe. These are the paintings by Rublev and Rembrandt, the music of Beethoven and Tchaikovsky, the scientific laws of Newton and Lomonosov; these are the industrial giants covering our continent from the Urals to Lorraine, unique cities, and the people of the continent with their culture, skills, and goodwill.

Europe was the stage of the epoch-making event of world history—the Great October Socialist Revolution which mapped out the general directions and main trends for world development. Socialism, which first became a reality in our country, has turned into a world system whose actions on the international scene support the endeavours of the peoples seeking to achieve independence and social progress, and are aimed at securing the principal goal of preserving and strengthening peace. As stated in the new edition of the CPSU Programme, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union attaches much importance to the further development of peaceful, good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between European states. An indispensable condition for accomplishing this task is respect for the territorial and political realities which emerged as a result of the Second World War and relentless struggle against all manifestations of revanchism.

The European peoples' close ages-old cooperation has always borne rich fruit. It grew more plentiful when the guns were kept silent, and was reduced to ashes when they fired. Attila's hordes had come as far as the Marne, laying waste huge territories. Baty's horsemen had reached Silesia, leaving behind a razed and scorched Rus. For centuries internecine and dynastic feudal wars drowned the continent in blood. Napoleon's far-reaching ambitions cost Europe millions of human lives. The arrogant and mindless Kaiser, with the connivance of a handful of shameless money-makers and arms industrialists, launched the First World War. The tortured edifice of the Cologne Cathedral, Pushkin's grave desecrated by the Nazis, fires fed by books and the burning down of unique monu-

ments of culture, and above all—the irreplaceable loss of the most valuable thing on Earth—human life—these horrendous results of the Second World War are still fresh in our minds, serving as a reminder and a warning to future generations.

Europeans never submitted to their fate. The idea of lasting peace has always lived in their hearts, finding expression in philosophic concepts and artistic images, and in quest of the solution to international legal problems.

This task, however, could not be accomplished in a society rent by social antagonisms. History knows quite a few attempts that were made to set up a universal system of European security. The walls of the old City Hall in Münster, West Germany, are decorated with the portraits of the ambassadors who conducted lengthy debates on the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia which was to put an end to the devastating Thirty Years War. The Treaty was signed, but Germany remained dismembered and its feudal aristocracy continued to settle scores with the use of arms and with support from its high and mighty foreign patrons.

At the Vienna Congress held in 1815 in the Hofburg Palace the European monarchs made an attempt to establish a new order on the ruins of Napoleon's empire to guarantee stability in Europe. It was to consolidate the social status quo, i. e. the stability of the feudal-absolutist regimes, and nip in the bud anything close to free thinking or love of freedom. That was the reason why the system created by the decisions of the Vienna Congress was short-lived. The revolutionary storms of the mid-19th century and the Crimean War toppled the edifice that had been set up by Metternich and Alexander the First.

The Versailles is another reminder of an attempt at establishing a universal structure of European security, as abortive as previous ones. It is common knowledge that Versailles Conference boiled down to a trial of the victor over the vanquished, and simultaneously to reactionary collusion against revolutionary movements and Soviet Russia. The Versailles Treaty not only failed to give security to Europe but sowed the seeds of a new war that was unleashed by the Nazi aggressors.

Could it have been averted? It could, if the European countries had pooled their efforts and come out with concerted, vigorous, coordinated action in defence of peace. But this did not take place although as far back as the 1930s the Soviet Union had already been persistently fighting for collective security in Europe. The floodgates of the Second World War were opened by the four-power-deal in Führerbau, the Nazi party's headquarters in Munich. It is said that British Prime Minister Chamberlain had an abject fear of planes. Yet during the crisis of 1938, provoked by the Nazi clique, he made three flights to Germany where he met with Hitler: the Western reaction was that anxious to come to an agreement with the aggressor on a common anti-Soviet platform. At the Munich conference in September 1938 Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia to the Nazis, prompting them by this act to unleash a new war.

This diverse and bitter experience is sufficient proof of the consequences inherent in the policy of confrontation when states have nuclear means of warfare in their arsenals, and when the main line of confrontation between the two social systems runs across European territory.

"The European home is a common home where geography and history have strongly bonded together the destinies of tens of countries and peoples", said Mikhail Gorbachev. "The peoples of Europe can save their home and make it better and more secure only on a collective basis, by adhering to sensible norms of international intercourse and cooperation". The foundations for that were laid in Helsinki. In the ultimate end positive changes in the European climate will benefit the whole world, including the United States.

The development of world events has reached a point when it is necessary to take crucial decisions, when any inactivity or delay is tantamount to a crime, for the question is one of preserving human civilisation and life as such. That is why the Soviet Union and other socialist countries continue to believe that it is necessary to spare no effort in order to break the vicious circle of the arms race, not to miss a single chance to turn the course of events for the better. The question is quite acute and quite definite: to rise above one's narrow interests and realise the collective responsibility of all states before the danger that confronts the human community on the threshold of a new century.

There is an alternative to the nuclear Apocalypse. It is shown to us by the Communist Party and the forces of socialism. And this is quite natural. The founders of Marxism-Leninism substantiated the idea of peace as the major communist principle and advanced a realistic programme for the prevention of new wars. The achievements of world socialism, as well as the radical changes that are taking place in the peoples' minds today, create the prerequisites for the solution of this paramount task.

Man's reason, omnipotent and inexhaustible as it is, is one of his most powerful weapons. It rules that in the prevailing international situation it is necessary to make radical changes in the way of thinking and line of action that have remained unchangeable for ages. In our time it is futile to strive for security only by modernising one's shield and sword, even if they are space-based. Security cannot be ensured today along the lines of building up arms and achieving military superiority. What is needed is profound realism and political courage—the courage to take steps to curb the arms race and achieve arms reduction. This approach is expressed in the Statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev where he advanced a programme of eliminating nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

Most Europeans are aware of the need to apply maximum effort to create an atmosphere of trust and cooperation on the continent and find constructive solutions to the problem. They understand that further progress towards safeguarding security in Europe is inconceivable without a broad political dialogue conducted at different levels. Such a dialogue could give the key to normalising relations of genuine peace and security among the European peoples. It would provide an opportunity for exchange of opinion and should be aimed at rapprochement on the most urgent problems, developing coordinated concepts for a new system of interstate relations in Europe and their implementation on a joint basis.

Political dialogue is a major element of the practical implementation of peaceful coexistence, which, according to Lenin, gives the peoples "the only correct way out of the difficulties, chaos and danger of wars".¹ The attitude to this principle shows better than anything else the earnestness of any politician and the true aims of his work.

It is not by chance that so many conferences, symposiums and colloquiums are organised by public effort, showing that the people have no intention of accepting the routine development of events. Scientists, physicians, teachers, trade union members, women's, youth and religious organisations hold forums to find the answers to issues of war and peace. They try to work out an approach to problems whose solution may put an end to acute contradictions. Public hopes and confidence stimulate

¹ V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1966, p. 357.

the spirit of the Helsinki forum which has outlined the ways of European development for years ahead.

The Soviet-American summit has stimulated this quest and strengthened the belief in its ultimate success. The new sentiments that have taken shape in Europe are reflected in statements by many prominent leaders advocating the continuation of the dialogue, and Europe's more weighty contribution to detente and the struggle against the dangerous plans for militarising outer space.

As emphasised by Horst Ehmke, Deputy Chairman of the SDPG faction in the Bundestag, in one of his speeches, "Although the talks in Geneva had failed to settle the major questions of ending the arms race, their results and, above all, the joint statement on the agreement that nuclear war should never be unleashed instil us with hope. Now the task is to see that the Geneva talks are followed by concrete action, first and foremost in what concerns the curbing of the arms race". According to Volker Rühe, Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, "Europe's historically conditioned endeavour for good-neighbourliness and cooperation should be used for improving East-West relations".

The reality of such an endeavour which is growing in scope and strength can be observed on the example of the third meeting between public representatives from the USSR and the FRG which was held in Bonn last December and which this author had the honour to attend. The previous two meetings were held in Bonn and Moscow. The Soviet public was represented by the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. SDPG leading figures took part in the meetings from the West German side.

The word "Geneva" was reiterated time and again in the hall of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation where the meetings were held. Willy Brandt called the Soviet-American dialogue in Geneva a good beginning and stressed the need to continue and to specify the agreements reached. As SDPG leader he said that his Party was interested in the "non-militarisation" of outer space. West German representatives dwelt on the idea that absolute security for one can mean absolute insecurity for another. This reaffirmed the well-grounded apprehension that the setting up of a US space "shield", i. e. the realisation of the SDI, can only destabilise the strategic situation in the world, being an attempt to safeguard US security at the expense of the security of the USSR. The West German participants in the meeting expressed concern that the arms race in outer space was liable to turn their country into a low-security zone.

On the other hand, some of them were worried by the possibility of a Soviet-American agreement, which in their opinion would leave, allegedly, Western Europe outside the sphere of world development. The Soviet participants in the meeting said that the USSR, being part of the continent, did not draw a line between its own and European security, and that it was sincerely interested in the contribution of the Europeans along equal lines to the solution of peace and disarmament problems. In this connection it was stated that Western Europe, and above all West Germany, has such a high prestige in world affairs that it can and must make a tangible contribution to solving disarmament and security problems. By backing up the "star wars" plans it would forfeit the possibility of conducting independent policy and vigorously contributing to European security.

To be sure there was a difference of opinion on several major points. Certain West German representatives tried to justify the SDI, alleging its stimulating effect on technical progress. The question arises: at what price? What is technical progress worth if its results promote the threat of war?

Others brought charges against the Soviet SS-20 missiles, refusing

to understand that they were but a counterbalance to NATO's relevant nuclear arsenals, a counterbalance that the USSR was ready to discard on a mutual basis, of course. After all, the USSR and the other socialist countries stand for the ridding of Europe from nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical ones, for all time.

Despite disagreement on other questions, the participants in the discussion were unanimous with regard to the most essential point: the Geneva meeting had established a new political and psychological climate in the world. What mattered now was to translate into life the agreements reached and thereby easing world tensions and give the people greater confidence in their future.

This is a noble, but difficult task, and the cause of this is rooted in the policy of the US Administration. US State Secretary George Shultz, speaking a short time ago before the Pilgrims' Society in London slipped into positively undiplomatic language when he said: "Sometimes you hear Soviet claims that the danger of war in Europe has been growing. That's nonsense." Nevertheless he regards the need to preserve NATO's military might and implement the US "rearmament programme" as the only possibility of ensuring stability in Europe.

In this connection one cannot help recalling Winston Churchill's notorious Fulton speech, in which 40 years ago for the first time after the Second World War the principle of confrontation was openly set off against the principle of peaceful coexistence.

It is well known that Churchill had spent several weeks working on the speech which he delivered in Westminster College in Fulton (USA) on March 5, 1946. In actual fact he had been preparing this speech for several decades, for it epitomised the credo of imperialist leaders. And it was not by chance that he had spent that winter in the United States where he coordinated with President Truman the general idea and the main trends of his speech. For it also expressed the political credo of the US imperialist circles. The US President undertook a thousand-mile-long journey to introduce the speaker to his listeners. Truman's presence showed that in his speech Churchill would make public the long-term programme of the forces that were eager to snatch up the banner of anti-Sovietism and anticomunism that had fallen from the hands of the frenzied Führer.

The speech contained almost a word for word reiteration of the theses vociferated by Hitler's propaganda minister Goebbels in his hysterical speeches at the Sport Palaz in Berlin, where he claimed that the world was being threatened directly by a war and tyranny that issued from none other than the Soviet Union and international communism.

Having painted the devil, Churchill offered an antidote to the evil in the form of a "fraternal association of English-speaking peoples". This would mean, he explained, special relationship between the British Commonwealth of Nations and the British empire, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, a relationship which could lead one day to a common citizenship of these peoples.

The part of the speech where he proposed to Washington close military cooperation was distinguished by its highly concrete character. The contemplated alliance was spearheaded against the USSR and revolutionary movements. It was Churchill who coined the expression the "iron curtain", which, he claimed, had divided Europe along the line—Stettin on the Baltic and Trieste on the Adriatic, an expression which was eagerly snatched up by anti-Sovieteers of every stripe.

Churchill also formulated a policy "from the position of strength", claiming that his meetings with Russians had convinced him of their particular esteem for strength. He called for an immediate use of force

against the USSR while the USA had monopoly of the A-bomb. In his far-reaching plans the strength factor was to lay the groundwork for the Anglo-American world domination, whereas the Soviet Union would be faced with the choice of capitulating or falling victim to a preventive war.

The gist of Churchill's speech was his appeal to unite mankind under Anglo-American leadership for a "crusade" against the USSR, the country that had suffered the greatest losses in routing Nazism and liberating Europe and had frustrated Sea Lion operation under which the Nazis were to have invaded the British Islands.

It had been noted in the Soviet Union at the time that Churchill had taken the warmonger stand and by his Fulton speech resembled Hitler. In an interview with a *Pravda* correspondent the head of the Soviet government, Stalin, said: "Churchill and his friends in Britain and the USA are actually offering the non-English speaking nations a kind of ultimatum: You'd better submit to our rule of your own free will and everything will be all right, otherwise war will be inevitable".

Britain, however, was much too weak to challenge the USSR, and the leadership in the policy of confrontation went over to the USA. A retrospective view of the postwar period shows that the revival of militaristic trends in Western Europe had practically always been prompted from without, and first of all, by the USA. It continues to spare no effort to widen the gap between Western and Eastern Europe and to bind its allies still closer to its anti-Soviet course.

The leaders in Washington do not miss a single chance to foist upon their partners and the West European public views that are in tune with Churchill's Fulton speech. The author had the opportunity to be an eyewitness of their tactics at the International Conference on Security and Prospects for Disarmament in Europe that was held in the Geneva Palais des Nations in December 1985. The Conference held under the auspices of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the French Institute of International Relations attracted many leading scientists—experts on disarmament and security, military men, diplomats and statesmen from many countries.

Ex-Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Eugene Rostow's behaviour at the Conference was more like that of the counsel for the prosecution, so strong was his desire to put the USSR in the dock! His report contained in concise form the general line of the US participants in the conference: to intimidate Europe by a "Soviet threat" and convince it that its safety lay in submissiveness to the USA.

As for the USSR, Rostow openly advised it to return to the policy of tsarist Russia which had "cooperated with the other Great Powers of Europe throughout most of the century after 1815". Of course, Rostow cannot possibly believe that the USSR will pursue the policy of the Holy Alliance that had been knocked together at the Vienna Congress for the suppression of revolutionary movements, the more so that it will willingly reject its socialist system. That is why he advocates a policy of ostracism towards the USSR, which he claims threatens "the entire Eurasian land mass".

The allegations that the USSR was out to establish control over the "entire continent" and make the territories of the insular Great Britain and Japan "vulnerable", presented as they were in pseudo-scientific garb, were in effect nothing less than the shopworn figments of vulgar anti-Soviet propaganda, charging the USSR with "militarism and expansionism" and "aggressive actions", and attempts to "achieve a plausible first-strike capacity in order to separate the United States from its allies both in the Atlantic and the Pacific".

The entire package of pseudo-scientific lies served quite a practical purpose. Rostow was out to prove the uselessness of holding talks with

the USSR and therefore to call in question the forums that were being used for such talks within the framework of the European process. The grounds for this, in his opinion, were their participants' discussion of symptoms instead of the causes, and that these forums "have not achieved any significant improvements in security, either in Europe or elsewhere". Another of his conclusions boils down to the following: the USSR has not shown any signs of capitulation, the West must increase its military potential, implement its urgent programme of building up US nuclear arms, including MX, Midgetman, Pershing and cruise missiles, and develop "defensive weapons", or to be more precise, realise the "star wars" programme.

As we listened to the American participants in the conference: Eugene Rostow, Ambassador Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, we could not help wondering what had brought all these top-level figures to the Conference. The answer was quite obvious: Washington was worried by the impact of the Soviet-American summit on the European public which welcomed all positive changes in the international climate, and was anxious to dampen its vigour. The thaw that had set in after the summit meeting in Geneva was stimulating positive trends on the European continent and its peoples' urge for the revival of detente and the curbing of the arms race. The US hawks have ample cause for worry. The group of prominent US leaders was definitely out to bring down the impression from the Geneva meeting, contaminate the psychological climate with mistrust and fear, sow discord among the European peoples and widen the gaps between them. In the ultimate end they would prefer to perpetuate the split in Europe, put a brake on the European process, and whip up the arms race on the continent. The spectre of Fulton had made its appearance in the Palais des Nations decorated with the gilt frescos.

Rostow's speech was but a single example of how Washington ideologies its foreign policy, providing ideological reasons for its arms race and the policy of confrontation. In the dispute between the two opposite social systems and world outlooks the USA and several of its West European allies regard military superiority as the chief argument. For they set their hopes not on sensible arguments and convincing example but on the latest weapons as a means of getting the upper hand over existing socialism which they label an "empire of evil". The launching of an "anti-communist crusade" is an eloquent example of such an outdated view of things.

O utdated is the word, for anticommunism often reaches a stage bordering on religious fanaticism. It brings to mind the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the Inquisition and auto-da-fes, the fury of the Calvinists, the brutalities committed by Thiers' cut-throats against the Communards, the anticommunist frenzy of Nazism... And it is outdated not only from the point of ideological motivation but also in terms of political reasoning.

For many centuries the enemies of Russia have been casting aspersions on the country and accusing it of aggressive ambitions. Suffice it to recall the forged "Testament of Peter the Great", secretly fabricated in the French Foreign Ministry to justify Napoleon's campaign against Russia, which ascribed plans for "subordinating Europe" to Russia. To provoke a conflict on Russia's southern borders and divert its forces from the main theatre of war the scribblers claimed that Peter the Great had intended to dismember Iran and "advance to the Persian Gulf". Incredible as it may seem, today too one comes across allegations of the USSR's "drive to the Persian Gulf" which are used as a plea to declare the adjoining area a "sphere of the USA's vital interests".

-Another example: Henry Martin, a French historian, wrote in his book *La Russie et l'Europe* of the growing threat to Western civilisation on the part of the "Muscovites". The book came out in 1866, four years before the total defeat of the French by the Prussian army at Sedan! Kaiser Germany's upper crust, while getting ready for a world blood bath, raised a hue and cry of the "Slavonic threat" and Wilhelm II rejoiced in anticipation of "the final battle between the Germans and the Slavs". A "Bolshevik threat" was the leitmotif of the Third Reich's propaganda machine.

Beginning with Herberstein and Staden (16th century writers) certain Western circles had been seeking to prove that Russia was a non-European state, and that Europe extended from Brest in the West to Brest in the East. Yet, in the 18th century Voltaire remarked that "Russia is Europe".

Indeed, the Soviet Union is an inseparable part of Europe in terms of geography, economy and culture. Its contribution to the peaceful development of the European continent, to its stability, cannot be overestimated. The Soviet Union has always believed that differences in social systems and ideology cannot hinder the development of normal, civilised relations between states with opposite social systems in Europe. It was the development of these relations in scope and depth that set off detente, which the USSR regards as a natural and essential stage towards creating a reliable and all-embracing security system.

It is largely through the efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries that Europe has become the birth-place of detente, of the Helsinki Final Act. Since its signing the European process has increased the peace potential of mankind and contributed to the strengthening of European and world peace. One may say that Europe has become a model of detente for other continents.

The code of peaceful life for Europe outlined in Helsinki is incompatible with the arms race that is being kept up on the continent. It is clear to all that in resolving the problem of security high on the list of priorities is reducing military confrontation, ridding Europe of all nuclear and chemical weapons, and cutting down conventional weapons. These goals can be attained only along the lines of peaceful coexistence, detente, disarmament, strengthening confidence and cooperation, by overcoming the negative consequences resulting from the deployment of US missiles in Europe.

The Soviet Union's stand on these problems is clear enough. It is ready to negotiate on the most radical measures that would turn Europe into a continent of peace. Mikhail Gorbachev's Statement proposed the complete elimination of Soviet and US medium-range missiles as a first step to freeing Europe of nuclear weapons.

The USSR confirms its proposals by concrete action: it has already introduced on a unilateral basis a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles and has brought down the number of SS-20 missiles in the European zone to the June 1984 level. With regard for the withdrawn SS-5 and SS-4 missiles the USSR now has less medium-range ballistic missiles than 10 or even 15 years ago.

Such a programme calls for a definite reply. It is all the more urgent bearing in mind that world politics has incorporated a new and dangerous element—the USA's intention to militarise outer space in whose infinite expanses it hopes to achieve a decisive superiority. The militarisation of near space is a grave threat to European security. The SDI cannot provide 100 per cent leak-proof defence for the USA, to say nothing of Western Europe. Moreover, the USA is quite capable of using the space "shield" for a "forward-based" venture in Europe that would turn the latter into a theatre of military confrontation. On the other hand, if the

SDI served also as a shield for Western Europe its dependence on the US "umbrella" would turn it into a US satellite. This would enable the USA to harness Western Europe's scientific achievements to the SDI and thus drain its intellectual potential. The result would be the inevitable loss of its independence.

However some people in Western Europe disregard all sense of reason. The FRG, for example, has chosen to take part in the SDI. Moreover certain West German circles are anxious to supplement the SDI with a West-European space "shield" in the form of "European strategic initiative". According to specialists, this venture would prove useless from the point of technology, ruinous in terms of spending, and harmful in terms of politics, for it would widen the gulf between Western and Eastern Europe and undermine the continent's security.

It is the task of all Europeans to strengthen all the positive results that have been achieved in international affairs instead of indulging in imperial space ambitions.

Its peace potential and the wisdom acquired through ages of experience have made Europe the birthplace of the policy of detente. They are certain to guide it safely through the maze of unsolved problems.

Europe has a ramified mechanism of cooperation and it should be used as fully as possible to keep up the European process. It is necessary to reach as quickly as possible an agreement in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and in Stockholm on the principle of non-use of force and confidence-building measures. It is essential that economic and scientific and technological ties between East and West be developed on a comprehensive basis that deliberate obstacles to trade exchange be done away with, that more joint effort be put into the environmental protection and humanitarian exchange, that feelings of mutual sympathy and respect among nations be promoted.

"Circumstances change, principles do not," were the words of Honoré de Balzac. The political situation in postwar Europe has repeatedly changed, but the principles of Soviet foreign policy on the continent have always been the same. Europe is a common home for all its peoples. No task is more noble and lofty than to jointly protect this home from the holocaust of a new war, to strive for and find a common language for achieving mutual understanding and cooperation among all its inhabitants, to turn Europe into a seat of goodneighbourliness.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

USSR: EUROPEAN ROLE IN INF, SDI ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED

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[Article by E. Silin, deputy chairman of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation: "Ways of Safeguarding European Security"]

[Text]

A new situation in many respect is taking shape in Europe, and in the rest of the world for that matter, as a result of the large-scale Soviet peace initiatives set forth during the official visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to France and the Soviet-American summit at Geneva, and also in the Statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, of January 15, 1986. This is readily understandable, considering that the afore-mentioned proposals comprise a comprehensive programme for safeguarding both universal and European security and for extending and strengthening the European peace process.

Europeans living in different parts of the continent realise more clearly today than ever before that the key issues connected with the consolidation of peace and security and the development of European cooperation should be resolved not just anywhere but in Europe itself. However, this does not mean, of course, that the Soviet Union denies the importance of the long-standing ties between Western Europe and the United States or that it would like to "drive a wedge" between these ties. The USSR is disinclined to underestimate the role of Soviet-American relations in the destiny of Europe as well.

Europe, however, is above all our common home, and it is Europeans who have to establish peaceful goodneighbourliness in it. All European states, irrespective of size, are responsible for the solution of the problems of vital importance to it. Today, when Europe faces a most important choice—either continued instability, which is fraught with the danger of a nuclear explosion, or a lower level of military confrontation and a return to detente and continued progress along this path—no country can shirk its responsibility.

The scope of the measures to strengthen European security being advanced by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries meets the objective demands of the military-political situation that has taken shape in Europe. Today's world has indeed approached an extremely dangerous point. The US plans to emplace attack armaments systems in outer space are evoking particular concern. The European continent may become the epicentre of the military threat hanging over the entire world.

It is only natural, therefore, that the focus of the Soviet programme for improving the situation in Europe is on measures to reduce the danger of

a nuclear confrontation on the continent. Owing to the reluctance of the United States and its NATO allies not to deploy US first-strike nuclear missiles in a number of West European countries and to listen to the appeals of the peace supporters and halt the deployment of ever new Pershings and Tomahawks there, previous attempts to settle the nuclear problem in Europe and to limit and then fully remove nuclear weapons from its territory have been unsuccessful. The search for a solution to the present dilemma has become still more difficult with the appearance of the American "star wars" plans and the involvement of West European NATO members in them.

The USA and NATO have purposely deadlocked the problem of lowering the nuclear confrontation level in Europe. Displaying no signs of the restraint and flexibility needed in the present situation, they have, on the contrary, been intent on stepping up military pressure on the USSR to the utmost. Under the circumstances the Soviet Union has again demonstrated the capability to administer an adequate rebuff to all attempts at pressuring it, and at the same time an ability for fresh thinking and practical actions commensurate with the threat to universal peace being posed by the forces of imperialism.

The new Soviet peace initiatives open up for Europe the prospect of becoming an important link in the Soviet programme of ridding the Earth of nuclear weapons within the next 15 years before the end of this century. Developing the idea of ridding Europe of nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical, this country proposes a radical step towards eliminating, already at the initial stage, all Soviet and American medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles in the European zone.

Many Europeans are well aware of the fact that the path being proposed by the USSR is a constructive and realistic one. "Declaring in Paris the new Soviet proposals on limiting nuclear arsenals and prohibiting space-based weapons", wrote the prominent French political scientist Paul-Marie de la Gorce in the November issue of *Le Monde diplomatique*, "General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev has undertaken a diplomatic initiative capable of imparting to it the greatest chances for success and of winning the greatest support from the Western side. Typical of these proposals above all is the fact that they take into consideration the military-strategic relations between East and West as they are today."¹ Here the French analyst particularly singled out the Soviet proposal on consideration of the problems of nuclear and space-based weapons apart from the problem of medium-range missiles, as well as the Soviet Union's readiness to examine the question of British and French nuclear means apart from the balance of the strategic forces of the USA and the USSR.

Alongside the Pershings and cruise missiles, not to mention US forward based weapons, the Western side also disposes of the French and British nuclear potentials, the yield of which continues to grow, and it cannot but be taken into consideration in the European balance of forces. That is why many West European political and public quarters see logic in the Soviet proposal to France and Britain to initiate direct talks to pool efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem.

It is obvious that if the proposal on a total elimination of the Soviet and the American medium-range missiles in the European zone is implemented the USA will have to take upon itself an obligation to refrain from delivering its strategic and medium-range missiles to other states, while Britain and France should pledge not to build up their respective nuclear arms.

¹ *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 1985.

The West European countries should not overlook the fact that the USSR is displaying a readiness to elaborate a separate regional accord on medium-range weapons to the extent that the USA and its nuclear allies are prepared to go. For responsible Western politicians, to ignore the constructive Soviet proposals would mean risking a chance to settle nuclear problems in the new, considerably more difficult conditions and, therefore, disregarding the security interests of their own peoples and the hopes and aspirations of the broadest strata of the population which are advocating nuclear disarmament in Europe.

To conceal their reluctance to give the Soviet proposals serious consideration behind the smokescreen of propaganda, the USA and its NATO allies have put into circulation the version of the spurious "sevenfold superiority" of the Soviet Union in nuclear armaments in Europe. This latest NATO lie pursues the aim of weakening the tremendous positive effect the Soviet proposals have had among the Western public at large. In actuality, the countries of the North Atlantic bloc have deployed in Europe 396 medium-range missiles, while the USSR has in the European zone 373 missiles, 243 of them SS-20s. Taking aviation into account, the NATO countries also have more medium-range delivery vehicles than the Warsaw Treaty (1,015 : 850) and more nuclear charges on them (approximately 3,000 : 2,000). Taking into account the differences in the composition of the nuclear armaments, the approximate equilibrium of both sides is evident.

Obviously, denial or distortion of these actual facts serves to thwart a European settlement in the nuclear sphere and to tether the USA's NATO allies to Washington's militarist course, which runs counter to the vital interests of the European peoples.

It is not fortuitous that in Europe the ranks of adherents of the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the continent are swelling, specifically in the North and in the Balkans, and support is also growing for setting up a corridor free of nuclear weapons along the line separating the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries in Central Europe. At a representative conference of parliamentarians of the North European countries held in Copenhagen in November 1985 a lively discussion was held on the prospects for creating such a zone. Even though the conferees were unable to arrive at agreed upon conclusion, the very idea, which enjoys support among broad circles of Europeans, will undoubtedly pave a way for itself.

Initiatives of this kind find understanding and support among the socialist countries. As Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in his reply to a message from Ken Livingstone, leader of the Greater London Council, when defining its attitude to the idea of nuclear-free zones, the Soviet Union does not make exceptions for any states, irrespective of whether or not they belong to military blocs. The USSR has one condition: if an individual country refuses to acquire nuclear weapons and does not have them on its territory, that country is given firm and effective guarantees by the USSR. For instance, should Great Britain completely denounce nuclear weapons and have foreign military bases removed from its territory, the Soviet Union would guarantee that Soviet nuclear weapons would be neither aimed at British territory nor used against it.

Support is also extended to the proposals being advanced by the governments of the GDR and Czechoslovakia and also by influential political forces in a number of NATO countries on the creation of a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe. The legitimate concern of the European peoples over the buildup of the chemical arsenals of the USA and NATO was intensified even more with the launching overseas of the production of binary toxic agents designated for the European theatre of hostilities. The stand of the Soviet Union, which is prepared to take part in an agreement on a zone free of chemical weapons, is geared towards completely ridding Europe of

this means of mass destruction. Moreover, as it follows from the Statement of January 15 this year, this country considers as fully feasible the task of completely eliminating even in this century such barbaric weapons of mass destruction as chemical weapons.

At the same time, the line of the NATO militarists opposed to this idea is in effect aimed against Europe, since the continent, which has not forgotten the horrors of the gas attacks of the First World War, has been called upon by the very logic of things to become the initiator of the complete prohibition and destruction of all combat toxic agents.

The participants in the Sofia meeting of the PCC of the Warsaw Treaty states once again reminded the NATO countries of their proposal to conduct direct talks on the conclusion between them of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of armed force and on the maintenance of relations of peace, a treaty that would be open for signing by all European and other interested countries. They do not exclude even the possibility of establishing contacts between the organisations of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic alliance as such. Elaborating a modus vivendi that would take the edge off the current confrontation between the two military-political alliances in Europe is also deemed beneficial.

Of course, the most radical means of easing the existing tension would be to disband both alliances, beginning at least with their military organisations. However, the West is evidently not ready for this. We believe, nonetheless, that the NATO bloc, which tries to present itself as an instrument of peace, not war, could enjoy greater prestige by adopting the constructive proposals of the socialist countries. The absence of a positive answer to them again eloquently attests to the aims the Atlantic bloc was created for.

At the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe the representatives of the socialist countries are doing all in their power to see that the principle of non-use of force is implemented in as concrete and binding a manner as possible. To date many participants in this forum are in favour of rendering this principle as effective as possible. An accord on a specific selection of confidence-building measures in the military sphere could in turn become a useful stop-gap in the event actions by the other side are interpreted incorrectly.

The world public at large was supportive of Mikhail Gorbachev's statement in Paris about the Soviet Union's readiness to give a positive response to the proposal of a number of states, the neutral ones above all, concerning a mutual exchange of annual plans for military activity, about which notification should be given. Such a solution would help eliminate undue suspicion and would make covert preparations for war difficult.

According to the opinion expressed in the Soviet Union, it is high time to effectively begin dealing with the problems still outstanding at the Stockholm Conference. One of the most pressing problems is the need to reduce the numbers of troops participating in major military exercises notifiable under the Helsinki Final Act. Since the bottleneck at the forum in Stockholm is the issue of notifications regarding major ground force, naval and air force exercises, the USSR proposes a partial solution of this problem: to reach agreement now about notifications of major ground force and air exercises, postponing the question of naval activities until the next stage of the Conference.

Now there exist opportunities to reach accords at this forum. The public at large in the member countries of the European process is insistently advocating a successful conclusion of the current phase of the Stockholm conference devoted to confidence-building measures and security. And this, in turn, would make it possible to set about a discussion on the crucial issues of disarmament in Europe provided for in the Conference mandate.

Another reason the European public is rightly sounding the alarm is that the so-called conventional armaments of the NATO countries are approximating mass destruction weapons in their combat characteristics. Drawing on this, the Pentagon and NATO are intensifying the aggressive thrust of their military doctrines, including in them provisions on the delivery of "deep" strikes at the defensive systems of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

In the light of the afore-mentioned the question of reaching an immediate accord at the Vienna talks on a mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in Central Europe is becoming particularly topical. Today it would seem that a framework is emerging for a possible decision to reduce Soviet and US troops and subsequently freeze the level of the opposing groupings' armed forces in Central Europe. The USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies are determined to achieve success at the Vienna talks. If the other countries also want this, 1986 could become a landmark for the Vienna talks too.

Thus, in all areas leading to reduced military confrontation on the European continent, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have set forth specific major proposals. It is important for the West European countries to regard them with the responsibility which the urgency of the current stage of international developments requires.

The above-mentioned also fully applies to such a problem as the prevention of the militarisation of outer space. "The rationality of immediately reaching an agreement on nuclear parity, but on a lower level of strategic nuclear arsenals is an indubitable matter," Paul-Marie de la Gorce goes on to note. "However, the prospect that the USA will deploy an antimissile system in outer space obviously changes the nature of the problem."² Not only the afore-mentioned French researcher but also many other sober-minded politicians in the West are aware of the fact that the military-political and international consequences of the creation of a large scale antimissile system with space-based elements cannot but have an effect on the situation in Europe, since the implementation of such plans would inevitably have an impact on the strategic balance and the security of the European continent.

The US Administration is assuring the West European NATO countries that the United States, by allegedly creating an antimissile "shield", intends to protect not only itself with it but its West European allies as well. Washington wants its allies across the Atlantic to pay for this "shield" with material and intellectual tribute in the form of involvement in the USA's military technology development programme. However, a great deal bespeaks the fact that the genuine aim of the American strategists is to protect the USA from a retaliatory strike in a critical situation and use Europe as an arena for hostilities. The deployment of medium-range US missiles in Europe and the adoption by the US land forces of the "air-land operation" doctrine and by the NATO Defence Planning Committee of a "deep echeloned strike" at the territories of the socialist countries are bound up precisely with these plans of the Pentagon.

The most reasonable alternative to the introduction of such a destabilising factor as antimissile weapons in the military-strategic balance of forces in Europe is to completely rid the region of nuclear weapons both medium-range and tactical ones. Meanwhile, Washington is not only trying to

² *Le Monde diplomatique*, November 1985.

involve as many West European countries as possible in its notorious SDI, but is also encouraging the initiators of the so-called European defense initiative.

The political and public forces of Europe which advocate the bridling of the arms race realise that these plans spell out a new stage in the escalation of armaments in Europe, blocking a solution to the question of reducing nuclear armaments on the continent. It is not accidental that in December 1985 the SDPG faction in the Bundestag tabled a draft resolution on the refusal of the FRG to take any part whatsoever either in the SDI or in the "European defense initiative." All mass movements for peace and nuclear disarmament in Western Europe are unequivocally negative in their attitude to any "initiatives" on the militarisation of outer space.

The French Eureka Project is also in the focus of attention of the European peace forces. Its authors stress the peaceful character of their project, but even circles involved in it do not deny the possible military "offshoot" of Eureka and its connection with the US "star wars" plan. Speaking in Brussels at a session of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation in November 1985, Chairman of the French National Committee for European Security, Pastor Albert Gaillard, and other speakers voiced the thought that the best guarantee of peacefully directing the research and development of Eureka would be to go all-European with it, i. e. to involve the socialist countries.

The European countries have already amassed experience of international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. The USSR has carried out over 40 joint projects of this kind with France alone and specific ones have been mapped out for the future as well. As French scientists state, cooperation with the Soviet Union in the exploration of outer space enables them to conduct research that substantially broadens the framework of national possibilities, furthermore, the Soviet side always focuses on mutual scientific interest, without claiming any privileges.

Soviet scientists collaborate in space exploration with experts from Austria, the FRG and Sweden as well. For West German scientists the Vega Project was the first joint effort in space exploration with their Soviet colleagues. The objective of the first Soviet-Swedish experiment (Promix), carried out in 1978 on board the Prognoz-7 Soviet automated station was to determine the impact of solar activity on the Earth's magnetosphere.

The experience of cooperation between Soviet scientists and the colleagues from France, the FRG, Austria and Sweden in such an important and complicated field as space research has shown that given understanding among states, major scientific projects can be carried out, making a weighty contribution to detente in Europe and the rest of the world, and to the strengthening of universal peace.

What, however, are the prospects for European economic cooperation in the light of recent trends? An analysis of them will show that after the crisis of 1980-1982, the worst in postwar decades, the world capitalist economy experienced somewhat of a spurt, but in 1985 development again slowed down, especially in the USA. According to forecasts, this downswing will continue in 1986. For all West European countries, the problems of unemployment and inflation are still vexing. The number of the unemployed in the OECD countries are at a postwar record high, and whereas in the USA it dropped somewhat in 1984-1985, in Western Europe it is growing steadily.

Another reason why the improvement in the Western economy does not look solid is the contradictory development of the US economy and also the entire international financial system, where, as is well known, the American dollar dominates. The boosted exchange rate for the dollar is cheapening imports to the USA, including from Europe, and is reducing the competitiveness of American exports. Hence the growing US trade-and-payment-balance deficit. The world's richest country has turned from an international

creditor into a debtor. Taking advantage of its privileged standing in the international financial and trade system, the USA is largely acquiring its well-being on credit.

As to trade and economic relations between CMEA and Western Europe, growth trends have been observed of late. However, from the standpoint of purely economic prerequisites for the development of East-West business ties, both sides have many untapped reserves. Given an improved political climate, the proportion of the West in the CMEA countries' foreign trade will undoubtedly grow. The CMEA economic intensification programme will naturally extend their export and import possibilities, including in business relations with the West and will change the existing structure of supply and demand for the better.

The CMEA countries are in favour of improved world economic ties through strict observance of the principles of equality, mutual benefit, respect for each other's interests, non-discrimination and non-use of trade as a means of political pressure. The record has shown the need to explore together optimal solutions for settling unresolved problems of the world community, for creating favourable conditions for trade, the imminent restructuring of world production and trade, rationally utilising raw material and energy resources, and environmental protection. It would be useful to work out an effective reform of the international currency system and legally formalise and normalise relations between CMEA and the EEC, and elaborate economic confidence-building measures as well.



The political realism that has evolved from lengthy and difficult experience enabled Europe to become the birthplace of detente and the successful holding of the European Conference which adopted the Helsinki Final Act. For the first time in history 33 European states, the USA and Canada agreed in this document with the principle of peaceful regulation of relations among the European countries, which the Soviet Union rightly identifies with the principles of peaceful coexistence.

As is emphasised in the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "the CPSU proceeds from the belief that the historical dispute between the two opposing social systems, into which the world is divided today, can and must be settled by peaceful means. Socialism proves its superiority not by force of arms but by force of example in every area of the life of society, by the dynamic development of the economy, science and culture, by improvements in the living standards of working people, and by a deepening of socialist democracy."

These provisions apply most directly to Europe, where the two world systems and two military-political alliances confront each other. The overriding prerequisite for the stable development of positive processes here is respect for the territorial and political realities that had taken shape as a result of the Second World War. Decidedly opposed to attempts to revise them under any pretexts, the Soviet Union will administer a rebuff to any manifestations of revanchism.

The accepted instrument for establishing goodneighbourly relations in Europe—the Final Act—has always been of fundamental importance in the normalisation of relations in Europe both in the relatively favourable atmosphere when detente emerged on the continent, and also in the current time of tension, when an effort has to be made for a return to detente. Thanks to the USSR's consistent peace policy which has always been instrumental to the implementation of the Helsinki accords, and its readiness to agree to reasonable compromises, Europe has managed to overcome the inertia of the cold war and weave a strong fabric of normal interstate relations in the form of numerous agreements, treaties, and so on.

Declared International Year of Peace by the United Nations, 1986 will witness a new meeting in Vienna of representatives of the European Con-

ference member states. Such general European events as the consultations in Ottawa on cooperation in the sphere of human rights and the Cultural Forum in Budapest planned at the meeting in Madrid have been held over the recent period. These meetings vividly exhibited the negative trend in a number of Western countries to carry ideological differences between capitalism and socialism over into the sphere of interstate relations, which prevented their participants from arriving at agreed upon recommendations. Nevertheless, both meetings left a positive imprint on the history of the European nations' relations by the very fact of their having been held and by the debates that took place (it is only to be hoped that the latter will be eventually continued in a more positive vein).

By all indications, detente in Europe and the Helsinki process have made great inroads on the continent. The European countries, which have realised their favourable influence from their own experience, have a vital stake in preserving the positive results of the detente of the 1970s. Today the process of appraising events in the international arena and the search for ways for a return to detente have come to include not only mass segments of the populations of European countries, the working-class and democratic movement and the peace movement first and foremost, but also other influential political and public forces.

There have been more and more actions for the creation of a system of broad political dialogue for the purpose of working towards genuinely peaceful and secure relations among the peoples of the continent. Ideas are being expressed about the improvement, deepening and developing of the machinery of such a dialogue, including on the interbloc level. Characteristic of the reflections and search being undertaken by various circles are the solution of European problems without power politics, war and aggression, and a vigorous striving for cooperation and simultaneously for a peaceful future for Europe.

The Conference of the Socialist International on Disarmament held in Vienna last October showed the considerable, yet not fully tapped potential in the struggle for peace and disarmament at the disposal of the socialist and social democratic parties. Also, at a number of the other forums the Social Democrats confirmed their readiness to explore ways of a peaceful settlement in Europe with due account for the demands of the masses and the powerful peace movement. In its Vienna Appeal the Socialist International Bureau underscored the particular concern over the danger of the arms race spreading to outer space.

The heads of the socialist and social democratic parties of the NATO member countries that gathered in Bonn late last November spoke out in favour of efforts to implement detente and arms control and to achieve disarmament through talks and agreements. The West European countries, read their joint communique, must realise their particular responsibility, both individually and collectively, for the preservation and strengthening of security on the European continent.

Also, representatives of agrarian, centrist and other parties in European countries are undertaking a search for peaceful solutions to European problems.

A look at the appeals of many international public organisations and peace movements espousing different ideological positions to the participants in the Soviet-American summit will amply show that even in quarters which just recently adhered to the concept of "equidistance" from the two superpowers many realised that prior to the Geneva meeting the Soviet Union had done its part to attain mutually acceptable accords on questions of interest to the West European and world public. For example, in the messages of the World Council of Churches, the Flemish Centre for Cooperation for Peace (Belgium) and a number of other pacifist organisations and movements contain the demand that the USA follow the example of the Soviet Union and cease nuclear testing.

The peace movement in Western Europe has far from given up even after the deployment of US nuclear missiles in a number of NATO countries. Suffice it to recall the 150,000 strong antimissile demonstration in Brussels on October 20, 1985, and the four million signatures collected in Holland under the appeal to prevent the deployment of US cruise missiles on its territory. Having preserved a developed infrastructure and a capacity for mass mobilisation, the peace movement in Western Europe is now elaborating goals and slogans and planning forums for its new actions.

The basic provisions of NATO's military and security policies are being subjected to an increasingly critical reassessment in West European countries. It is typical that whereas initially "alternative" ideas of security were voiced by individual politicians, servicemen, scientists, experts or small groups (e. g., Andreas von Bulow, Senghaas, Bastian, Aifeld, and Hennig in the FRG, Charles Barnaby in Britain, De Smaele in Belgium, and the Pugwash Working Group), today these ideas are becoming much more widespread in various political and public circles. Several political parties in Western Europe and the Socialist International have included "alternative" concepts in their programmes on security and military policy.

The views and "models" being proposed by these circles under different names ("non-provocational defence", "nuclear-free defence", etc.) are united by the overriding aim of reducing the danger of an outbreak of war between East and West in Europe, of easing the confrontation between the blocs, replacing "intimidation" with the philosophy of peace, and overcoming the current NATO strategy based on the initiating of a nuclear exchange. The ideas expounded in the report of the Independent Palme Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (the Palme Commission) are close to these concepts. The discussion on them is being joined by representatives of neutral countries and international institutes researching peace and disarmament.

Although a number of the afore-mentioned concepts are somewhat abstract and do not unmask the aggressive strategic doctrines of NATO and the military preparations of the bloc clearly enough, the "alternative" security ideas are winning increasing popularity, people viewing them as a path leading to a refusal of the employment of the nuclear armaments, to the reduced risk of the outbreak of a war in Europe, to the denouncing of militarism, and to the consolidation of genuine peace and greater well-being.

The innovative, bold approach of the Soviet leadership to the solution of universal and European security problems, which enjoys the support of the entire Soviet people, is generating tremendous international repercussions, prompting an unprecedentedly broad spectrum of socio-political forces in the West to think and act in a new manner. What with the need to strengthen European unity, the future structure of European security and cooperation is now forming from individual fragmented elements. This structure has to be perfected, naturally, and new forms of cooperation have to be explored in politics, economics and culture with due account given to the actual conditions existing both in the East and West of the continent. The Helsinki Final Act retains its intransient importance in the accomplishment of tasks crucial to all Europeans.

The destinies of dozens of countries and peoples living in their common European home are closely bound up by geography and history. Europeans can preserve this home and make their lives in it better and safer only through joint efforts, by following reasonable norms of international intercourse and cooperation.

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SALT/START ISSUES

SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON REAGAN SALT II DECISION

LD3112131 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Jun 86 First Edition pp 1, 4

[Text] The text of the Soviet Government statement follows:

The United States Government has taken a step that again reveals in all obviousness the essence of the current U.S. foreign policy course aimed at an arms race spiral in every way, at militarizing space, and at heightening international tension.

On 27 May, President Reagan announced a virtual refusal of the United States to subsequently observe the Soviet-U.S. legal treaty documents on the limitation of strategic offensive arms -- the 1972 interim agreement and the 1979 SALT II agreement. He stated that the United States would not be bound by strategic arms limitation agreements in future decisions concerning the development[stroitelstv] of U.S. strategic forces.

Thus, what the Soviet Union had warned about has occurred. The U.S. Administration, of all versions of its possible actions regarding the strategic arms limitation treaties and agreements, adopted precisely the one that undermines the foundation of the process of limiting and reducing such arms. Confronted with the choice of whether it should moderate its own arms programs or open the floodgate to an uncontrolled arms race, Washington preferred the latter. The President's decision signifies that the present U.S. leadership has resorted to an exceptionally dangerous measure in the cause of destroying the treaty system which curbs the nuclear arms race and thereby creates conditions for the conclusion of new agreements.

Concretely, a U.S. withdrawal from SALT II is programmed for the end of this year when in the process of deploying new arms -- heavy bombers with cruise missiles, in particular -- the United States will overstep the limit of 1,320 MIRVed strategic delivery vehicles. The President directly stated that the United States would not dismantle an appropriate number of existing arms to keep within SALT II limits.

The U.S. Administration has virtually taken a course towards fully implementing a comprehensive strategic nuclear build-up program that it adopted and which, to a certain extent, is restrained by the SALT agreements. In particular, the United States intends, along with the deployment of B-52 and B-1B bombers with long-range cruise missiles, to develop [sozdat] the second new type of ICBM "Midgetman," to deploy another SD MX ICBMs, and to speed up the development [sozdaniiye] of an "advanced cruise missile." It has been announced that work will be continued to develop [po sozdaniiyu] space-strike weapons within the framework of the "star wars" program.

The dismantling of two Poseidon missile-carrying submarines, scheduled soon in view of the commissioning of the eighth Trident submarine, is officially explained by budget considerations and not by a desire to observe SALT II provisions.

Attempts are being made to justify this by certain USSR "violations" of the agreements. Such assertions, however, are unfounded from beginning to end. There have not been and are no such violations. The U.S. Government knows that fact well. The Soviet side has repeatedly exposed on the strength of facts Washington's attempts at levelling far-fetched accusations at the Soviet Union with the introduction of each new U.S. military program that does not fit into the existing treaty limits.

The principled approach of the USSR to the existing agreements on arms limitation is known. The Soviet side observed and observes, strictly and in full volume [V polnom obyeme] all the commitments taken by it. In doing so, it proceeds from the premise that continued observance, on a mutual basis, of the obligations formulated by SALT II would have considerable importance for the maintenance of the strategic balance and the enhancement of security.

However, the U.S. Administration is guided by different considerations. Earlier, too, the administration did much to undermine SALT II, which was a result of many years of cooperation between the USSR and the United States in the seventies in the cause of terminating the race in nuclear missile weapons and of promoting strategic stability. The first attempt to undermine it, was the nonratification of it then, the circumvention of its provisions through the deployment of first-strike missiles in Western Europe -- the ballistic Pershing-2 missiles and cruise missiles -- the departure from its individual provisions, and now, an outright renunciation of the treaty.

All this is making it more obvious why the U.S. Administration holds such an unconstructive stand in the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms, just as in the question of what a new Soviet-American summit meeting should be like. At the same time this confirms the well-grounded character of the Soviet view to the effect that such a meeting requires the readiness of the American side to achieve concrete results on at least one or two questions in the sphere of security, and also the existence of a relevant political atmosphere. It is clear that the challenging move made by the United States in no way attests to either one or the other.

It should also be clear that the Soviet Government will not impartially watch the United States break down the agreements reached in the sphere of the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The American side should have no illusions that it will manage to get military advantages for itself at the expense of the security of others.

As soon as the United States goes beyond the established levels of arms or otherwise violates the other main provisions of the mentioned agreements observed by the sides until now, the Soviet Union will consider itself free from the relevant commitments under the 1972 interim agreement and SALT II and will take the necessary practical steps to prevent the military-strategic parity from being upset. These measures will rule out the possibility of the United States acquiring advantages in the main types of new strategic arms it is now developing and that it intends to phase into service.

The Soviet Union will continue to take all measures in order to ensure reliably the security of the socialist community and will continue to do everything necessary to enhance international security.

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SALT/START ISSUES

BEIJING REPORTS 'IMPORTANT CHANGE' IN U.S. ARMS POLICY

HK010748 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 1 Jun 86 p 6

[("Roundup" by Zhang Yunwen: "An Important Policy Change")]

[Text] President Reagan announced on 27 May that he has ordered the dismantling of two old Poseidon submarines. The next day, a new nuclear submarine armed with 24 multi-warhead Trident missiles started its sea trials. The President took this action because if he had not dismantled the two old vessels, the number of U.S. multi-warhead missiles would have exceeded the limit set by SALT II of 1979. However, Reagan announced at the same time that the United States will not be bound by this treaty when it deploys new B-52 bombers carrying cruise missiles before the end of this year. Senior government officials stressed that this is a new policy decision, showing that in the future the administration will not base its decisions on the deployment of new weapons on SALT. U.S. analysts pointed out that this is the Reagan administration's "most important" change to date in the field of arms control.

SALT II was an agreement reached by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1979 during the term of President Carter. The Senate refused to ratify the treaty after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. However each side has stated that it will not violate the treaty's provisions so long as the other side abides by them.

President Reagan has consistently opposed this treaty, but he has adopted a "policy of not breaking it." In June last year and April this year, Reagan declared that he would continue to abide by the treaty. Reagan's sudden change now has aroused strong controversy among senior government officials. There have always been two schools of thought within the Reagan administration over how to regard SALT II. Civilian officials in the Defense Department and officials in the disarmament administration have vigorously opposed continued adherence to this treaty, on the grounds that the Soviet Union has long ago broken the treaty through a whole series of moves such as deploying new SS-25 intercontinental missiles and building giant radars, and so the United States should not unilaterally abide by the treaty. However, certain officials in the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference advocate that the United States continue to abide by the treaty. They are worried that after the treaty is scrapped the Soviet Union will be in a still more advantageous position in arms control negotiations.

According to American public opinion, Reagan's 27 May decision took account of both these schools of thought, but leaned more toward the hard-liners. When the United States this autumn deploys its 131st multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle, and the number of B-52 bombers must not be exceeded, it will break through the limit of 1,320 stipulated by the treaty [sentence as published]. Some disarmament experts point out that this decision shows in substance that the United States will no longer be bound by the treaty. Weinberger repeated in a speech at West Point Military Academy on 28 May that the United States will no longer be bound by SALT II. Shultz said at the NATO foreign ministerial meeting on 30 May that the treaty "is already out of date." (Warnke), who took part in the treaty negotiations, acknowledged that the hard-liners in the administration have come out the winners in a policy debate, and the President has now informed the Soviet Union that "the treaty is dead."

Reagan's decision has greatly disappointed arms control advocates inside and outside the administration and in Congress. These people hold that President Reagan has now changed his original "political commitment" and "retreated" on disarmament policy. This will result in the arms race getting out of control. According to reports, Congress is currently discussing the adoption of a new restraining resolution. The NATO foreign ministers currently meeting in Canada have also expressed profound disquiet over this policy decision.

Analysts hold that this policy change of the Reagan administration is aimed partly at reassuring conservative Republicans in Congress before the mid-term elections, and is partly an attempt to force the Soviet Union into concessions.

American observers also point out that President Reagan's 27 May statement also leaves room for maneuver. While announcing that the deployment of new bombers before year-end would not be bound by the treaty, he also said that if the Soviet Union takes "constructive measures," and stops its consistent treaty violations, and if progress is made in the Geneva disarmament talks, then he will reconsider the matter. The inference is that he may continue to abide by the treaty. Nitze, the State Department's disarmament adviser said that although the decision has been made, people should "see what happens."

The second half of this year is the decisive period for the fate of SALT II. At present, two-thirds of congressmen advocate maintaining the existing treaty, while the Western European allies are strongly opposed to scrapping it. The possibility remains of a U.S.-Soviet summit after the mid-term elections. All these factors may lead the Reagan administration to make a new choice.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

LOMEYKO: USSR TO 'REDUCE' IF UK 'ELIMINATES' NUCLEAR ARMS

LD271637 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 27 May 86

[Text] Moscow May 27 TASS -- The recently concluded session of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna can be regarded as a concrete step along the lines of broadening international cooperation in the field of creating a regime of safe development of the nuclear power industry, stated Vladimir Lomeyko, head of the Press Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He answered questions posed by Soviet and foreign correspondents here today during a briefing dealing with current policy matters.

This session, Vladimir Lomeyko pointed out, supported the Soviet initiative on convening a special international conference under IAEA auspices, a conference which is to work out a series of measures to create an international regime of safe development of the nuclear power industry on the basis of close cooperation among all IAEA member-countries. The Soviet proposals on establishing a system of prompt notification and provision of information in the event of breakdowns and malfunctions at nuclear power stations were supported as well.

In answer to a question about the visit of a group of British parliamentarians to the USSR, Vladimir Lomeyko said that Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during the conversation with the British parliamentarians had once again set out the USSR's stand on the problems of limiting nuclear arms and achieving disarmament. Soviet proposals, including those which are more detailed, had been once again brought up for Britain's consideration.

It had been emphasised, in particular, that if Britain officially takes a decision to eliminate nuclear weapons in its territory, the Soviet Union would be ready to reduce its nuclear potential in an equivalent manner. The proposal is of tangible concrete character. Besides, it had been added that if Britain simultaneously removes foreign nuclear weapons from its territory, the Soviet Union would also guarantee that its nuclear weapons would not be trained on Britain's territory and would never be used against that country.

Putting forward these proposals, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said, the Soviet Union takes into account the wishes of the British public at large, that is interested to know what guarantees can be there if Britain does not have nuclear weapons in its territory and what measures would be taken on the part of the Soviet Union if Britain eliminates its nuclear weapons.

Thus, Vladimir Lomeyko emphasised, the Soviet Union not only advances proposals on solving the problem of nuclear arms from the point of their elimination by the year 2000 but also develops the proposals with due regard for the wishes of other countries. Such a stand once again shows the Soviet Union's constructive approach to the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons as the core of the problem of preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

PM281547 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 May 86 Second Edition p 3

[V. Dodonov article: "Europe Without the Nuclear Threat: Who Is Against?"]

[Text] The elimination of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe could significantly improve the situation on the European Continent and initiate progress along the path of ridding the planet of nuclear weapons. In principle, everything necessary for solving this problem exists. Above all, there is the specific program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000 advanced in the Soviet statement of 15 January 1986. As is known, this program envisages that a decision on the total elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles -- both ballistic and cruise missiles -- is reached and implemented at the very first stage. Here the United States must pledge not to supply strategic missiles and medium-range missiles to other countries, and Britain and France must pledge not to increase their corresponding nuclear missile potential.

Peace-loving forces on all continents have highly evaluated the Soviet Union's proposals for eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe. This is no coincidence. Implementing the Soviet proposals would not harm anyone's interests and at the same time would substantially enhance international security.

However, the United States and its closest allies have not yet shown any readiness to embark on the path of constructive decisions. As though on orders from across the ocean, West European politicians and statesmen have begun making statements voicing all kinds of "anxieties" over the elimination of medium-range missiles on the European Continent. They present American arguments as the fruit of joining "close consultations" within the NATO framework.

The chief cause of these "anxieties" is the fact that the United States is certainly not seeking a radical decision on medium-range missiles in Europe. And various attempts are being made to erect obstacles in its path. In particular, Washington would like to revive the "zero option" which contains a demand for the unilateral destruction of all Soviet medium-range missiles, and not only in Europe but also in the east.

The Soviet side has repeatedly demonstrated in a well-reasoned manner that the number of SS-20 missiles in the east of the USSR is conditioned by the military-strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific and, above all, by the fact these missiles counter the corresponding American medium-range nuclear arms capable of reaching the USSR's territory. As those U.S. nuclear means are reduced, the number of SS-20 missiles there will be reduced accordingly. In addition, the Soviet nuclear disarmament program provides for the elimination of medium-range nuclear means in that region too as the corresponding stage.

The claims that the Soviet Union, having eliminated its SS-20 missiles in Europe, could transfer them from the East to the West are farfetched. This clearly smacks of profanation. The United States could act in similar fashion: The standard of modern technology makes it possible also to solve problems other than these [reshat i ne takiye problemy]. As for the Soviet SS-20 missiles in the east, they have the clearly defined tasks of ensuring the USSR's security precisely in that region.

The Western thesis that the USSR is supposedly seeking to prevent the "modernization" of the British and French nuclear forces does not stand up to criticism at all. It is no secret that the nuclear potential of those states is growing rapidly and its share in the overall nuclear balance and, still more, in the European nuclear balance is increasing. Therefore, when we speak of eliminating Soviet and American medium-range missiles, it can be considered fair that Britain and France will not carry out a quantitative buildup of their own corresponding nuclear arms.

M.S. Gorbachev advanced a new proposal during his meeting with British parliamentarians: If Britain officially adopts a decision to eliminate its nuclear weapons, then the Soviet Union would be prepared to make an equivalent reduction in its nuclear potential. And if, at the same time, it removed foreign nuclear weapons from its territory, then the Soviet Union would also guarantee that its nuclear weapons will not be targeted on British territory and will never be used against Britain.

Talk of the permissibility of "modernizing" the British and French nuclear forces, and virtually, of legitimizing a further increase in the number of NATO missiles and nuclear warheads targeted on the USSR is frankly aimed at achieving military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries.

There is a particularly great deal of talk in European capitals that, without American missiles, Western Europe will supposedly find itself less secure in the face of the Warsaw Pact countries' armed forces and conventional arms. This is pure bluff. Long ago it was recognized that approximate parity exists between the two military groupings in conventional arms also. Moreover, the Soviet proposals consider eliminating not only nuclear but also other kinds of weapons, including conventional weapons.

This is the aim of the important Soviet initiative concerning conventional arms and armed forces throughout the territory of Europe -- from the Atlantic to the Urals -- which M.S. Gorbachev expounded at the 11th SED Congress. The USSR proposes reaching an agreement on a considerable reduction in all components of European states' ground forces and tactical aircraft, as well as the corresponding U.S. and Canadian forces stationed in Europe.

Here the formations and units to be reduced would be disbanded and their arms would be destroyed or stored on national territories. Operational-tactical nuclear arms would also be reduced simultaneously with conventional arms.

The Soviet Union has already done a great deal to achieve progress at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms. The Soviet side recently placed on the negotiating table a draft agreement on medium-range missiles. The Soviet draft represents a good starting point for totally ridding Europe of nuclear weapons and gives a strong boost to galvanizing the talks as a whole.

Even Western mass media have been forced to admit that the Washington administration does not show the least desire to take the Soviet side's legitimate interests into account and does not wish to reach an honest, mutually acceptable agreement. The American proposals on medium-range missiles are aimed, above all, at harming the Soviet Union's security and achieving U.S. military superiority. What really lies behind the unconstructive stand taken by Washington and its West European allies is the desire to keep, at any price, a group of nuclear first-strike means in the immediate proximity of the Soviet Union's borders.

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CWO: 5200/1388

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET BOOK ON BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES REVIEWED

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 3, Mar 86 pp 137-139

[Book by V. G. Trukhanovsky, *The British Nuclear Weapons. History and Politics*, Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya Publishers, Moscow, 1985, 229 pp (in Russian)]

[Text]

The British nuclear forces—the second largest in the capitalist world, after the USA—are assigned a prominent role in the military and political strategy of imperialism in general and of the aggressive NATO bloc in particular. The research undertaken by Vladimir Trukhanovsky, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, into the history of the British nuclear forces, the content and specific forms of the British nuclear strategy, and the effect the possession by Britain of the nuclear weapons has on Britain's foreign policy, is highly relevant, therefore, especially in the light of the Soviet Union's latest proposals on an exchange of views with Britain and France on problems of medium-range missile weapons in Europe.

The author shows that as it was making its first steps in the 1940s to develop the nuclear bomb Britain regarded it not only as a weapon capable of accelerating victory over Nazi Germany but primarily, as a clout it could wield to reinforce its international positions, and revive its empire and influence in the postwar world. Although the war effort compelled Britain to team up with the USA on the atomic bomb project, the then British rulers were convinced that possession of the bomb in the postwar world would give ultimate control to a country that owned the secret of its production (p. 19).

At the same time, Britain's rulers considered thermonuclear weapons right from the start of the nuclear buildup as an impor-

tant means of attacking socialism and preventing its influence spreading around the world. Recalling Winston Churchill's words, who said during the war years that "Soviet Russia had become a mortal danger to the free (i.e. bourgeois) world," the author emphasizes: "Since that time, Britain's foreign policy and nuclear weapons plans have been moulded by this conception of Anglo-Soviet relations" (p. 18).

The author graphically demonstrates that the anti-Sovietism engrained in the British rulers' minds prevented them, and continues to do so today, from realistically assessing Britain's ability to influence international relations or to assess the potential of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, or the sources of the latter's impact on the world scene. Whereas four decades ago they rejoiced at the prospect of acquiring the nuclear weapons, ruling out a possibility of the Soviet Union being able to manufacture them within at least the next 15 years, they were deeply shocked in 1969, when the Soviet Union developed its own bomb (p. 72). There were many more shocks in store for them, because all plans made in the USA, Britain and NATO as a whole to attain military superiority over the USSR and other socialist countries members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and all their attempts to talk to the socialist countries from positions of strength were overturned. The author sees a close parallel between Winston Churchill's aphorism that Britain arms itself to talk and the words the world

has been hearing from the US President in the 1980s. History repeats itself, he concludes, and imperialist politicians are its worst pupils (p. 73).

Despite their vast experience and practicalism, British leaders were lacking a realisation of the fact that their hopes of speaking on equal terms with the USA, given their own nuclear forces, and soliciting US help in winning back their imperial grandeur were vain. In his 1946 speech in Fulton, USA, Winston Churchill looked forward to a pooling of British and US efforts and means that would open up a bright future for Britain and the United States in a whole century ahead (p. 42), while Clement Attlee dreamt of a time when Britain would greatly reinforce its positions by establishing very close relations over the atomic problem with the United States. In practice, however, Britain found itself cut off from US nuclear plans in that same year 1946 (following the adoption in the USA of the MacMahon Act banning cooperation with other countries in the nuclear field). This development left Britain with no choice but work on its own nuclear bomb and even adopt its strategy of "an independent nuclear deterrent".

The logic of anti-Soviet militarist course and cooperation with the USA in the cold war context, however, were irreversibly forcing the British ruling circles to put their interests behind those of their overseas partner. The declaration of the principle of interdependence and cooperation between the USA and Britain in the nuclear field in 1958 (after the Soviet Union launched its first artificial earth satellite) turned out to be a step towards Britain's greater dependence on the USA. The most conspicuous evidence of this was the British government's consent to allow the USA to build nuclear bases on British soil, under complete jurisdiction of the US government; the building of British nuclear submarines armed with US missiles; the support Britain gave to the NATO decision on the nuclear "rearmament" of the bloc (the deployment of US medium-range missiles in Western Europe); and some other steps the British govern-

ment took to hitch the country's policies more tightly to Washington's imperial strategy that poses a threat to world peace, not the least Britain's consent to participate in the "strategic defense initiative", which Washington is foisting on its NATO partners.

However, the book lacks detailed analysis of the US attitude to the British nuclear weapons in our day and about the role to which it is consigned by the current US Administration which is openly steering a course towards higher international tensions and confrontation with socialist countries.

Particularly praiseworthy is the fact that by drawing extensively on historical and contemporary materials, including his personal conversations with some British politicians, the author exposes the demagogical tactics and political subterfuges Britain's rulers are resorting to to conceal their true intentions and to cloak them with a mantle of legality before Parliament and the country's population have a chance to criticise them. "All Foreign Office documents", the author writes, "irritate the researcher with their endless diplomatic cliches designed to deceive nations and history" (p. 66). He cites numerous examples of British rulers' formal declarations being contradicted by their actions, a practice they continue to this day.

The realities are such that, as is shown in the monograph, all nations, including the British people, are gradually learning to recognise the true purport of the policies pursued by their rulers who rely on strength and nuclear intimidation behind a screen of rhetoric and intricate diplomatic and political maneuvering. The best evidence of this is the steadily growing antiwar movement which has swept the cross-section of the British public and has, in effect, caused a split in the country. The book presents in considerable detail the history and current state of the antinuclear movement in Britain. Vladimir Trukhanovsky's latest monograph, providing a blend of scholarly argumentation and political analysis, is a useful addition to the campaign against the imperialist threat of nuclear war and for a more healthy international climate.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET WEEKLY SEES CONTINUING DEBATE IN NETHERLANDS

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 11, 24 Mar 86 pp 26-28

[Article by G. Sidorova: "Is the Missile Issue Really Closed?"]

[Text]

Personal Contribution

462 Herengracht, Amsterdam. "Welcome to the cradle of Dutch capitalism," the host heartily bade us enter. A little later, as we sat over the traditional Dutch lunch of freshly salted herring with milk, I learned that Mr van Eeghen had been quite serious: his trading company, the oldest in the country, had been passing from father to son for more than 300 years. The people of Amsterdam have good words to say for the ancestors of the present owner: they did a great deal to make the city prosperous.

But why did the businessman, for whom every minute counted, willingly agree to receive us, representatives of the Soviet Peace Committee visiting the Netherlands at the invitation of Dutch anti-war campaigners?

I first heard the name van Eeghen from my Dutch friends in a context which seemed to have little to do with business, namely, in connection with the deployment of U.S. missiles in the country. Van Eeghen, a veteran of the second world war, is a man of infectious optimism. Using his wide connections in the country and outside it, he has conducted a "personal diplomacy" campaign, as they say here, over the past few years to promote disarmament and better East-West relations.

"Everyone should feel responsible for what is happening in our world," he says.

Van Eeghen's views are shared by many of his compatriots. Awareness of this responsibility has been growing fast in the Netherlands. It has taken just a few years to jolt out of their "steady equilibrium" millions of Dutch men and women, who are for the most part apolitical and only concerned with their personal welfare, and get them to go out into the streets to protest, make their voices heard and clash in debates.

The force that set the country in motion and divided it into opponents (obviously in the majority) and supporters of missile deployment is quite complex. It includes the fear of a nuclear apocalypse, special concern for the land, which has been reclaimed from the sea with perseverance and toil over the centuries, and the characteristic Dutch habit of planning thoroughly for the future. The choice between accepting U.S. missiles in the Netherlands and rejecting them is just the tip of the iceberg.

The Dutch have now for the first time given serious thought to who decides their fate, the government chosen by them or NATO, controlled from the other side of the ocean. (The Constitution, incidentally, prohibits the surrender to any outside party of the sovereign right to declare war.) Should the Netherlands obediently follow the lead of NATO or will it be able to play a more tangible role in Europe? Will the Dutch be more secure thanks to

U.S. missiles, a drastically 'new factor in the strategic situation of their country, which previously had only tactical nuclear weapons on its territory! A well-informed official at the Dutch Foreign Ministry said: "The Dutch feel insecure. We are 'shoulder to shoulder with the United States,' and at the same time finding ourselves more and more often in disagreement with it. Previously, the Europeans in NATO turned away from many cardinal problems, especially the drafting of security strategies. But today an awareness is growing that Europe should have a say in the North Atlantic alliance and stand up for its own interests."

The first anti-nuclear battle in the Netherlands brought victory to the majority: the Dutch rejected the American neutron bomb. But the second battle, that against the missiles, lasted almost six years and was won by the government.

Here, briefly, is the background to the debate.

In December 1979 NATO approved a plan to deploy U.S. first-strike nuclear weapons in Western Europe, with the Netherlands slated to receive 48 cruise missiles.

In June 1984 the Dutch government, under pressure from the public, postponed its decision on the missiles, simultaneously linking it to the overall number of Soviet medium-range missiles in the European and Asian (sic!) parts of the U.S.S.R.

In November 1985 the Lubbers government gave consent to missile deployment—in the teeth of the view of the overwhelming majority of the population, opposition parties, trade unions and public organizations. A quick of Western democracy: four million adults (out of a total population of 14.5 million) signed an appeal for the missiles to be rejected.

In December 1985 Parliament opened debates on a five-year agreement with Washington (plus one year for notification) to build and operate missile sites and deploy missiles as from 1988.

In February 1986 Parliament approved the agreement.

So the decision has been taken. But is the issue really closed?

Thorn in the Flesh

I talked to officials of the Christian Democratic Appeal, a partner in the

ruling coalition. Party ideologist Arie Oostlander and M. A. Kolster, secretary of the foreign affairs committee, thought that the matter really was closed. The debates on the missile problem were over and hardly likely to be reopened in the election campaign (elections have been scheduled for May). Our conversation (before the ratification of the agreement) then ran as follows.

Kolster. Two diametrically opposite ideologies have been confronting each other on the European continent since the second world war. That is why it is necessary to build up defences, deploy missiles and take other measures. The Netherlands does not have much leeway in decision-making: we are a member of NATO and should act accordingly.

New Times. How does decision on missiles tally with the stipulation of the government White Paper on Defence: "Along with the need for a justifiable policy on nuclear armaments, there is a scarcely smaller need for adequate support for such a policy in society?"

Oostlander. It is the anti-war movement that is mostly to blame. Peace campaigners have an irresponsible approach to the problem and are fanning differences.

New Times. What has been planned by the present government to mark the International Year of Peace, for the observance of which your representative at the U.N. voted?

Oostlander. We do not concern ourselves directly with this matter. The Peace Year is a matter for organizations of young people.

We could hardly have expected the leaders of the Christian Democratic Appeal to answer differently, although there were some people in the parliamentary ruling party who had levelled criticism at government policy. What amazed us was the haste and even bravado with which these politicians had "closed" the complex question. It was almost as if they lacked confidence in future developments.

In Clingendael, a park in a Hague suburb, stands a 17th-century mansion which once belonged to a noble family. During the second world war it was the residence of the Nazi administrator of the occupied Netherlands, and now it is the seat of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Since 1983 studies at the Institute have been financed by the ministries of defence, foreign affairs and public education. The Institute trains and advises prospec-

five leaders of various government agencies. The leisurely pace of academic life in the old house seems far removed from the political storms of the past few months.

We asked the institute's director, H. J. Neuman, for his view of the present-day situation in the Netherlands. Parliament was at the time debating the missile agreement.

"NATO has been taught a good lesson," he said. "It is absurd to take a decision 4-5 years before it is to be implemented. The next time the allies will be wiser. The failure of the Dutch government to take a decision right away gave a free hand to the peace movement and created a division in society. Now the missiles are a thorn in the government's flesh. The opposition Labour Party will also find the going tough in the elections. If it continues to oppose the missiles, it will attract votes—but the Right-wing parties will refuse any coalition with it. If it revises its position, however, it will lose votes but be welcome in any coalition."

The director, abandoning diplomacy, made it clear that the screws should be tightened right away...

The Dutch authorities tried to "reassure" peace campaigners in their own way some years ago. They set up an Advisory Council for Peace and Security. One of the council's main recommendations to the government in the past few years was to follow the NATO course. Council members willingly discuss the situation in the country and even show a measure of realism in doing so. According to the council's vice-president, Professor Egbert Boekeler, the debates on missiles are bound to be reopened as a result of further scientific and technological progress: the missiles will have to be either modernized or removed in five years' time.

But what does Labour, the leading opposition party, think of the future?

"We will not cooperate on the deployment of missiles in 1988," I was told by Maarten van Traa, international secretary of the Labour Party. "There is little likelihood, of course, that the newly elected government would unilaterally tear up the agreement with the U.S.... We are raising many issues in our election campaign and the missile problem is one of the most important. We are going to emphasize the need to improve relations between all states in Europe and will draw attention to some of the Soviet disarmament proposals."

Meanwhile, in his address to an extraordinary Labour congress, Labour leader Joop den Uyl welcomed Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives for the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in the European zone.

Victories and Setbacks

In planning future campaigns, the organizers of the mass movement against NATO's nuclear plans concentrate on the vital problems of disarmament. "We are not going to surrender," Siebie Strikwerda, member of the leadership of the No to Cruise Missiles national coordinating committee, said with a smile. "At present we are discussing our plans. One proposal is to organize a civil disobedience campaign. We are also thinking of staging a protest in front of Parliament. We would like to involve people in a campaign against Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative and we think it necessary, too, to attack anti-Soviet stereotypes, which are firmly embedded in the minds of some of our compatriots."

It is these anti-Soviet stereotypes that have prevented the emergence of a united front of those opposed to missiles and desirous of a new policy for the country. They have become a stumbling block in the way of the Dutch peace movement. The movement temporarily retreated not only before the NATO military and political machine but also before itself, when at a crucial point in the anti-missile campaign, to the joy of the NATO chiefs, the leaders of a major Dutch organization of peace campaigners, the Inter-Church Peace Council, initiated a debate on "the equal responsibility of the superpowers" for the arms race in Europe (and this at a time when the U.S.S.R. was making the West one constructive proposal after another, and setting an example unilaterally) and then began looking for malcontents in the Soviet Union and pompously held some of them up as "the true peace movement" in the U.S.S.R. They also charged Moscow with inciting ideological strife between the systems and thus "blocking agreements" (at a time when calls for a "crusade" against the U.S.S.R. were sounding from across the ocean). All these "revelations" were barriers in the way of cooperation between the anti-war movements in socialist countries and Dutch peace campaigners. As a consequence, the Dutch peace movement became virtually the only one in the West without any effective contact with partners in

the East. Fortunately, the Dutch themselves are now beginning gradually to pull down these barriers.

Despite all their difficulties, however, the Dutch peace campaigners have won a remarkable victory. They have awakened millions of their compatriots to the need for practical action for a genuine, non-nuclear national security.

Small wonder that the ruling coalition was in such a hurry to close the missile question, so inconvenient to it on the eve of the elections. Small wonder that the government has lately been drawing public attention to its plans to drop some of the country's earlier nuclear commitments to NATO, such as the maintenance of two squadrons of F-16 jets and Orion planes. The scheme has misfired, however, and earned the government a rebuke from NATO headquarters rather than cheers from the electorate. The Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Bernard Rogers, was dispatched urgently to The Hague to tell the recalcitrant Dutch that the deployment of new nuclear missiles in the Netherlands by no means relieved them of their other commitments. The general added that under the nuclear strategy of the alliance, if a conflict broke out, as many NATO members as possible should become immediately involved in it.

The general's bluntness was fresh

proof that the Dutch peace campaigners had an uphill struggle ahead.

* * *

Amsterdam is a city of countless canals and 400 bridges, the first planned city in the world. It is a hub of business activity, the world's fourth largest financial centre. It is a city where organ-grinders roam the streets and bankers consider that exhibitions of modern art in their offices set the right tone. It is a city in which houses resemble ships and boats have been converted into houses—it is cheaper that way, and there is not enough housing for everyone on dry land. The most impressive peace activities in the country also take place in Amsterdam.

We were taken through the embankment-like street of Amsterdam by a Dutch journalist friend. Our attention was caught by a strange sculpture in the square in front of the Rijksmuseum, the largest art treasury in the city. Our friend told us that it had been erected by participants in the first anti-missile demonstration in 1982. As we peered more closely at it we saw that the snow-white missile enmeshed in barbed wire was composed of two embracing figures. Does it symbolize the last nuclear embrace? Or perhaps an attempt to break out of nuclear bivaldom.

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CSO: 5200/1381

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA ANALYZES NETHERLANDS ELECTION RESULTS

PM270748 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 May 86 First Edition p 5

[Yuriy Kharlanov "Commentator's Column": "No Particular Change"]

[Text] The Hague — The results of the 21 May elections to the Second Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament have been announced. Just as pre-election opinion polls indicated, the opposition forces scored some successes. The largest among them -- the Labor Party -- will have 52 seats, compared with the 47 it won in the 1982 elections. The "Democrats '66" will have nine seats instead of six.

This success is, however, insufficient to result in any decisive change in the balance of forces in parliament. The main party in the incumbent bourgeois ruling coalition -- the Christian Democratic Appeal -- brings 54 deputies to the Second Chamber, compared with 45 in 1982. And even though its ally -- the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (liberals) -- lost 9 seats (27 instead of 36), the ruling parties will retain control in parliament. A number of small political parties lost their representation in parliament.

The election results demonstrated the desire of a certain proportion of Netherlands voters to maintain the status quo in the government arena. It was primarily economic considerations that played a role here. Recently, the ruling coalition has managed to somewhat reduce the number of unemployed and to achieve a certain revival in business activity and a fall in inflation rates.

Many Netherlands people are, as before, resolutely against the foreign policy course of the ruling coalition which, succumbing to pressure from Washington, pushed through parliament a decision on the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles on Netherlands territory. The losses suffered at the elections by the liberals, the most conservative and pro-American force in the coalition, indicate the widespread antimissile feelings among the Netherlands' voters.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

DECISIONS MADE SANCTIONING LAUNCHING OF BINARY ARMS

LD301210 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1109 GMT 30 May 86

[**"Statement by Soviet Government"--TASS item identifier]**

[Text] Moscow, 30 May (TASS) — In recent days the NATO military bodies, namely, the Military Planning Committee at the defense ministers level, made decisions sanctioning the launching of new-generation chemical weapons, binary agents, into production in the United States. NATO's actions thus impart utmost acuteness to the question of whether chemical disarmament will ever take place.

The answer to this question has always been unequivocal for the Soviet Union: Chemical weapons, a barbarous means of the mass annihilation of people, are to be totally banned and unconditionally eliminated. The only way to reach this goal is to make political decisions and achieve verifiable international accords. This means first and foremost that efforts must be intensified to draw up a multilateral convention to this effect, a step that has been urged by the UN General Assembly on more than one occasion and which was agreed on by the leaders of the USSR and the U.S. in Geneva last November.

This is precisely what the Soviet Union is doing. The latest Soviet proposals on this question, formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev in his 15 January statement and subsequently presented in a detailed form at the disarmament conference, make it possible to achieve by the end of this century the complete elimination of the chemical arms arsenals and the very industrial base for their production. Strict international control, including international on-site inspections, could be instituted to verify the process of chemical disarmament. These proposals take into account the positions of many other states, including the United States, and, in the opinion of virtually all the participants in the talks on drafting an international convention to ban chemical weapons, make it possible to overcome a number of situations which seemed deadlocked, including those related to verification.

The Soviet Union supports the proposals on the establishment of chemical weapon-free zones in central Europe and in the Balkans as an intermediate step and is prepared to guarantee their status if the U.S. does the same. The USSR jointly with its allies called for completely ridding Europe of chemical weapons. It has always strictly followed in its practical policy the principle of nontransfer of chemical weapons to anyone and their nondeployment in the territories of other countries.

But what is Washington's response? Advocating chemical disarmament in words, the United States, assisted by some NATO countries, such as West Germany, is acting very differently in practice. The decisions made by NATO in favor of binary weapons are

actually to program for years ahead not only the preservation, but the escalation of the chemical threat to all mankind. They are contrary to the task of eliminating chemical weapons, contradict the Soviet-American accords at the summit level in Geneva and cannot help doing grave damage to the work that is being done by the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a convention to ban such weapons.

These decisions are causing grave doubts about the sincerity of the statements of those who are supporting them in favor of arms reductions, disarmament and stronger international trust.

NATO's chemical rearmament program in Europe, which is oversaturated with deadly weapons of every type and variety as it is, is fraught with especially pernicious consequences. There is just one step from the launching of the production of binary weapons in the United States to their deployment in the territories of West European NATO members. Those who think that it all can end with the stockpiling of new chemical munitions in the United States itself, that is, where the Pentagon is not planning to employ them, are badly deluding themselves.

The Soviet Government strongly denounces NATO's chemical rearmament plans. It considers it to be its duty to draw anew the attention of the governments of the United States, other members of the North Atlantic alliance, and all the other European countries to the exceptional danger posed by these plans to the cause of peace in Europe and all over the world. The people must say no to binary or any other chemical weapons.

If the United States and its allies really have an interest in chemical disarmament, they should back it with practical deeds, at the negotiating table instead of starting another round of the chemical arms race, now is just the time to do so.

The Soviet Union for its part is prepared to do everything necessary to achieve a mutually acceptable and effectively verifiable accord. Reason must triumph over chemical madness.

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CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET CHEMICAL ATTACK WOULD BRING NATO NUCLEAR RESPONSE

London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 8 May 86 p 36

[Article by David Adamson]

[Text] **A** SOVIET attack with chemical weapons would force Nato to respond with nuclear weapons since it does not have a chemical armoury of its own, Lord Carrington, Nato Secretary-General, said in Copenhagen yesterday.

The alliance's Defence Ministers will meet in Brussels later this month to decide whether they should adopt a force goal requiring the United States to modernise its chemical weapons stock.

Approval of the force goal by the North Atlantic Council is required by the United States congress as a condition for approving the resumption of chemical weapons production.

Nato does not have any chemical weapons and the United States stopped producing them in 1960. Resumption of production is sought because of failure to agree a worldwide ban with the Soviet Union, which has large stockpiles of modern weapons.

Britain supports the Nato force goal on the ground that modernisation of the American Armoury, which could be moved to Europe in time of crisis or war, would contribute to "upholding Nato's current strategy of flexible response."

'Political football'

But the prospect of unanimity in the North Atlantic Council is threatened by Denmark and

Norway. Majorities in both countries' parliaments have expressed reservations about supporting new production.

Lord Carrington's visit to Copenhagen is intended to sway political opinion in favour of new chemical weapons as the lesser of two evils. Without them, Nato might be obliged in war to cross the nuclear threshold at an early stage.

A Nato force goal is a five-year planning target drawn up and prepared by officials in Brussels. Critics say the method has been adopted to avoid public debate in Europe, and the American Nato Ambassador, Mr David Abshire, told a Senate committee last month that "we have tried to avoid having this issue become a political football."

In Western Europe, France alone possesses significant stocks of chemical weapons. Britain abandoned production unilaterally in the late 1950s.

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EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET WEEKLY BLAMES U.S., NATO FOR CDE LACK OF PROGRESS

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 14, 14 Apr 86 pp 22-23

[Article by Y. Gudkov: "Before the Decisive Phase"]

[Text]

Stockholm's Kulturhuset, or Culture House, where the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is held, is situated in central Stockholm. It is a popular venue. Its day-to-day activities include exhibitions of painting, sculpture and folk art, demonstrations of educational and informative films and video. Scores of special interest groups meet here. A magnificent library occupies the ground floor, with a steep staircase leading to the long terrace on the first floor.

The entrance to the conference premises is heavily guarded—after the murder of Olof Palme, committed not far from here, the precautions do not seem superfluous. To enter the conference hall one has to pass the barrier of supersensitive metal detectors and a special police detail. Ideal conditions for thorough work are created here. The pace of the conference is mounting as the day draws nearer when it is to report to the participants in the Helsinki forum, who will meet in Vienna this coming autumn. So there is not much time left before the closing of the current stage, already fixed for September 19.

What are the conference's prospects of ending fruitfully—that was the question that most interested the journalists who gathered in Kulturhuset on the eve of the closing of the ninth session.

"I am confident that this conference offers what may perhaps be described as unique opportunities for reaching a

serious agreement," Oleg Grinevsky, the leader of the Soviet delegation, told newsmen. "Its contours have already emerged, taking, moreover, more concrete shape than ever before. It is obvious that what is needed today is the will to overcome the obstacles in the way of progress."

Indeed, last October consensus was reached on the issues to be incorporated in the final document. These included prior notification of large-scale military manoeuvres, exchange of observers and of annual plans for military activity; its limitation, and the non-use of force in international relations, or, to be more precise, the application of this principle to the conditions prevailing in Europe.

This understanding is of vital importance. It was achieved only in the second year of the conference thanks, primarily, to the constructive efforts of the delegations from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Participants in the forum emphasized that an important change for the better had taken place after the Soviet-French summit in Paris and the Gorbachev-Reagan meeting in Geneva, where the sides proclaimed their intention to work for the earliest possible and fruitful completion of the conference.

At this session the editing of the text of the final document began.

Late last year a mechanism for discussing and drafting concrete agreements was elaborated. Five coordinators, one each from Sweden, Finland and

Austria, and two from Switzerland, have been appointed to the five working groups, three of which will concentrate on political and two on military questions. I met Wolfgang Loibl, the coordinator from Austria, who described the procedure thus: At the present stage, when the positions of the sides have been set out and substantiated and the conference has proceeded to drafting the documents in the working groups, the coordinator is indispensable to achieving practical results. Since the conference chairmen are constantly succeeding each other, the job of coordinators, who are in fact chairmen of permanent working groups, is in the first place to contact the participants so as to compile the agenda for the coming meetings. They also collect the suggestions on the text of the future document and, taking them into account, submit a variant for discussion by the working groups.

"The session that has just ended lacked productivity," says Wolfgang Loibl. "In my opinion, this is due to the fact that it was to some extent transitional. I hope that at the concluding sessions the bulk of the issues will be settled."

So what is hindering progress at the conference?

Among the multitude of problems that inevitably accumulate at a forum of such a scale the most topical are nevertheless easily seen. These are the character of the agreements that are to be worked out and the way to reach them. The divide runs mainly between the stands of the Soviet Union and the socialist states, on the one hand, and the United States and its North Atlantic bloc partners, on the other.

One of the stumbling blocks is the non-use of force. This proposal was put forward by the socialist countries and adopted for discussion despite objections raised by the U.S. It argued that since the principle is recorded in the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, there is no point further reiterating it. But this is to distort the Soviet proposal. In an interview with your correspondent, Oleg Grinevsky underscored:

"We want to impart concrete content to this principle and make it as efficient as possible. We mean not only the non-use of force but the non-use of military force inasmuch as the conference is dealing with the limitation of military activity, with questions of security. We

are striving for an agreement that rules out the use of nuclear and conventional weapons, the use of force generally."

Such a radical approach is backed by the character of the proposed document. The Soviet side holds that an agreement binding for the participating states would best meet the interests of universal security. It proceeds from the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, which makes a special point of the fact that the political and military aspects of European security are mutually complementary. Then, the U.N. Charter (Article 52) provides for the conclusion of regional agreements "relating to the maintenance of international peace and security." It is also in line with the spirit of the November 21 Soviet-U.S. statement which declares that both nuclear and conventional wars are inadmissible.

Compelled to agree to discuss the proposal, the U.S. now advocates, contrary to its own earlier arguments, a bare reiteration of the general principle, avoiding concrete commitments. One reason for this is evidently the NATO military doctrine envisaging a first nuclear strike and the development of new types of conventional weapons systems of enormous destructive power, and, of course, Washington's stand on military superiority. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that greater security and broader cooperation in Europe are incompatible with this stand. Thus, "Atlantic solidarity" stands in the way of the settlement of urgent security problems.

The situation is more or less the same in the field of confidence-building measures in the military sphere. They are necessary indeed. Take, for instance, the scale of exercises which sometimes differ little from preparations for an assault. They are held to intimidate, to bring pressure to bear, as was the case with U.S. armed provocations in the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. That is why the socialist states' proposals provide for limiting the scale of manoeuvres along with prior notification of major manoeuvres and troops movements not only of land, but of air and naval forces as well. This corresponds exactly to the mandate of the Madrid meeting which points out that "these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and airspace." This is only logical if we bear in mind the role the Pen-

lagon assigns to the naval and air forces in the event of U.S. intervention in Europe.

Instead of confidence-building measures, the U.S. would rather have information, largely of an intelligence nature. The word "transparency" has of late become current in the lexicon of the U.S. delegation. In the view of its head, Robert Barry, the agreement to be adopted in Stockholm should be devoted almost wholly to transparency, i.e., to information, notification, warning, observation of, and supervision over, military activity.

Nobody denies the importance of information and control in the observance of agreements on concrete confidence-building measures. But, first, the agreements reached should be aimed at lessening the military danger and, second, the character of notification should enhance confidence, not undermine it.

"It is not a matter of information as such," says the head of the Soviet delegation, "but of its character. The proposed exchange of information on the stationing of military units, troop formations and headquarters might be used to target U.S. Pershings and cruises deployed in Europe. And what has this to do with confidence and security? Such information will inevitably be a one-way affair, binding for the U.S.S.R. and not binding for the U.S. since it is not a European state, and the agreement would concern only its troops stationed in Europe."

The striving to extract unilateral benefits from confidence-building measures, to sever the organic link between the volume of verification and the content of agreements subject to verification—that is the keynote of the U.S. delegation's activities at the conference. That is why the work begun on the text of the document—a moment of the utmost importance, testifying to the indisputable progress of the talks—proceeds very slowly.

As the decisive phase approaches, the differences in the positions of a group of neutral and non-aligned states and the NATO members, and even between NATO members, make themselves felt more and more. The Old World countries have concerns other than those of their transatlantic partner. This is borne out by the stands taken by Italy, Spain, Greece, Denmark, France and some others.

When the conference began its work in January 1984, a new cold war unleashed by the U.S. was at its high, and the arms race had entered a new spiral. The conference was close to being the only link in the waning East-West dialogue. Today the situation has changed perceptibly. The idea of universal security, which the 27th CPSU Congress defined as the main avenue of Soviet foreign policy, is based on concrete, far-reaching proposals winning increasingly widespread support. A substantial part of the new initiatives is addressed to Europe and promises reliable security on the basis of the Helsinki process, for the absence of which the Stockholm conference was convened.

One practical result of these initiatives is a set of proposals that open the way to reaching agreements in Stockholm. Furthermore, last autumn the Soviet Union agreed with the proposal put forward by neutral countries on the exchange of annual plans of military activity subject to notification. The CPSU General Secretary's January 15 statement directly indicates a way out of the deadlock in the matter of notification of major manoeuvres of the army, the navy and the air force. It is proposed to tackle the problem in stages, postponing the question of naval activity till a later date.

In these circumstances the agreed stand of the NATO states, which continues to adhere to the package submitted under U.S. aegis over two years ago, before the other participants' positions had been made clear, cannot but cause mounting confusion and protests. The package has now been carved up and served to the working groups as new proposals. This scissoring, not negotiation, diplomacy runs counter to the interests and aspirations of the majority of the conference. We are prepared to be flexible, time is pressing, a U.S. delegate said at the concluding sitting of the 9th session. But it is time for action, not mere words. The opponents of agreement will have to accept the responsibility if the hopes pinned by Europe on the Stockholm conference are not vindicated, if security and confidence are not consolidated after it ends. On the other hand, if the conference is a success, and the agreement on security signed, it

would become part of a universal system of international security aimed at consolidating trust between nations, an advance without precedent in the current decade.

"We are already thinking of the next, the 10th session," Ambassador Alois Rosnick, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, told your correspondent. "And it can be said even now that what is needed is the resolve to tackle the problems, speed up the editing process and focus attention on the central issues. Then the conference can finish its work in time and with results."

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET WEEKLY ON INFLUENCE OF 'NUCLEAR LOBBY' IN U.S. GOVERNMENT

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 14, 14 Apr 86 pp 14-15

[Article by K. Sorokin: "Nuclear Lobbying Group"]

[Text]

Originally called the Atom Energy Commission, the Department of Energy has from the outset been responsible for the development, testing and manufacture of nuclear warheads. The military aspect of the work of the department has come to predominate in recent years, with allocations on military-related activity increasing from \$3 billion in 1980 to \$7.4 billion in 1985, or from 25 per cent to 63 per cent of the total. This explains why the chiefs at the Department have always argued for a stronger U.S. nuclear potential, in terms both of quantity and quality, and have resisted any agreement with the Soviet Union that might slow down, let alone halt, the nuclear conveyor belt.

Efforts to ban nuclear weapon tests have encountered especially fierce opposition. The question first arose in the early 1950s because of the serious danger of environmental pollution as a result of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. The Soviet Union was the first nuclear power to declare that nuclear explosions for military purposes must be completely abandoned if general nuclear disarmament was to be achieved. This was stated in a package document submitted to the U.N. Committee on Disarmament on May 10, 1955. Appropriate proposals were also made at a summit meeting of the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Britain in July of the same year.

Washington took a negative stand and tried to push through the United Nations the idea that nuclear tests must

be recorded, not banned. In 1957 Lewis Strauss, then chairman of the Atom Energy Commission, organized a meeting between President Eisenhower and physicists Ernest Lawrence, Mark Mills and Edward Teller, who excited the President's interest in the prospect of creating qualitatively new weapons (neutron in particular) and talked him into promising not to narrow the possibilities of research and development by restrictions on nuclear tests.

A new series of nuclear explosions was to be carried out in the United States in the beginning of 1958. But the March 31 decision of the Supreme Soviet on the termination of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests in the Soviet Union put Washington in a difficult position. To maintain credibility in the eyes of the world community, it agreed in October to start negotiations with the Soviet Union and Britain on the stopping of nuclear explosions for military purposes.

But the American delegation impeded progress of these negotiations by wheeling out the old argument that national technical means were not sufficient to verify the observance of a future agreement. Many "arguments" were supplied to the American delegation by experts from the Atom Energy Commission who claimed, for instance, that the Soviet Union could get round a test ban treaty by carrying out secret explosions in huge underground cavities or by passing them off as earthquakes. In view of this the Unit-

United States insisted on an exorbitantly large number of inspections in areas of supposed violation and turned down the Soviet proposals on annual quotas for such inspections.

The coordinated and persistent efforts of the nuclear lobbying group led to a stalemate at the negotiations. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's consistent stand on the question of banning tests, the support of world public opinion, and the active position of developing nations compelled the United States to sign, in August 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, In Outer Space and Under Water.

But the chiefs of the Atom Energy Commission would not give up. In the course of debates on the ratification of the treaty they secured from Congress the right to hold a series of underground tests that would meet all the military needs of the United States.

Thanks to the exaggerated problem of verification the United States obstructed progress in achieving in the 1960s a complete ban on all tests. In the early 1970s American diplomacy discovered a "new" aspect of the problem—the supposed ability of the Soviet Union to carry out secret nuclear explosions with a very low yield.¹

The "new" aspect was not a chance invention. The nuclear lobby felt that détente presented a direct threat to their interests. It was in the period of détente that the Soviet Union and the United States concluded treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on underground explosions for peaceful purposes (with an agreed procedure of verification) which checked the arms race at least partially. But these treaties did not come in force, because they were not ratified by the United States.

President Carter, taking office, pledged to work for an early ban on tests for military purposes. The American-Soviet negotiations, started in 1977, were later joined by Britain. The broad international campaign forced Washington, in April 1978, to defer production of the neutron bomb.

The nuclear lobbying group sounded the alarm and resorted to a manœuvre it had tried two decades before. Late in the summer of 1978, Energy Secretary James Schlesinger, Harold Agnew, director of the Los Alamos Laboratory, and Roger Buzel, head of the Liver-

more laboratory, urged President Carter to authorize the continuation of work on third-generation nuclear weapons and get the framework of a future test ban treaty narrowed. The White House gave in, and the pace of negotiations slowed down. Nevertheless, some headway had been made by 1980.

The Republican Administration, which assumed office in 1981, conducted a dialogue with the Soviet Union from positions of strength. The securing of military superiority over the Soviet Union and of the ability to win a victory in any nuclear conflict was proclaimed the chief objective of U.S. military strategy. The concepts of "limited" and "protracted" nuclear wars and all delivering a pre-emptive nuclear strike were developed further.

The material foundation for these dangerous plans was to be provided by the nuclear rearmament programme announced in the autumn of 1981 and by the Strategic Defence Initiative proclaimed in March 1983. The Department of Energy lost no time in joining in the implementation of these programmes. It argued for an extension of the arms race and against holding substantive talks with the Soviet Union. It was chiefly of the insistence of the Department of Energy that Washington broke off the three-nation talks on the banning of nuclear tests and refused to reopen them in 1982.

The tasks now facing the Department of Energy are staggering indeed. At the beginning of 1984 the United States had 25,000 nuclear warheads of 26 types. Some 21,000 nuclear warheads are to be manufactured by 1988. In 1984 and 1985 the manufacture of eight new types of nuclear charges was started, and in the latter half of the 1980s four more types are to go into production. Fifteen types of warheads for the 1990s are at the blueprint stage. They are being developed by three laboratories of the Department of Energy. 1987 will see the completion of the eight-year \$3.6 billion programme for their modernization.

The best-known project in the "star wars" programme is the development of a nuclear-pumped laser. The first test was carried out in late 1980, and at least six have been detonated since then, the latest on March 22 of this year. Some 800 nuclear explosions have been conducted in the United States since 1945.

The implementation of numerous nu-

clear programmes calls for a large quantity of fissionable material which is obtained primarily from discarded warheads. But latterly the recycled material has ceased to be sufficient, and the additional production of fissionable material has therefore been sharply increased. For instance, twice as much plutonium is produced now than in 1979. A sum of five million dollars was allotted in 1984 for the updating of the enriched uranium plant at Oak Ridge.

Large-scale plans of this kind—and their realization will ensure constantly growing funds and influence for the Department of Energy—in no way accord with the prospect of banning nuclear tests. "The cessation of tests," Mikhail Gorbachev pointed out in his January 13 statement, "would indeed close the channels for upgrading nuclear weapons." Without the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests "there would still remain the possibility of developing increasingly sophisticated and lethal nuclear weapons and trying out new types of these weapons at test ranges."

To justify its refusal to join in the moratorium, Washington still cites the difficulties involved in verification. But this claim is not supported today even by scientists working with the Department of Energy. H.E. De Wolf, a physicist from the Livermore laboratory, has written, for instance, that "seismological detection is now good enough" and therefore "verification of ... nuclear test ban treaty is no longer a serious problem."

Indeed, the technical aspect is clear:

the national means are quite sufficient to ensure a reliable verification of both the moratorium and the complete ban on nuclear testing. Furthermore, to enhance the effectiveness of verification, in which Moscow is no less interested than Washington, the Soviet Union is prepared to agree on an international system of control. It is also prepared to accept the proposal of the leaders of the six countries for the establishment in their territories of stations to monitor observance of a test ban treaty, provided this proposal is also accepted by the United States. Moreover, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness—if the moratorium is joined by Washington—to agree with the United States on certain verification measures with the aid of international procedures and, if necessary, on-site inspection.

It is necessary, Moscow believes, to start without delay to elaborate an internationally binding nuclear test ban treaty by returning or resuming bilateral, trilateral or multilateral negotiations for this purpose, and without linking the test ban issue with any other issues. Moreover, Mikhail Gorbachev is ready to meet President Reagan in the immediate future in order to reach an agreement on the question of nuclear tests. There are no obstacles to this. Judging from its initial reaction, Washington does not want to join the moratorium or meet the Soviet leader on this question. As Mikhail Gorbachev said on March 29, the Soviet Union will not conduct nuclear explosions after March 31, provided the United States likewise refrains from testing. It cannot place its own security and that of its allies in jeopardy.

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RELATED ISSUES

SOVIET REPORTS ON MAY UN DISARMAMENT COMMISSION SESSION

U.S. Stance Attacked

LD052059 Moscow TASS in English 1743 GMT 5 May 86

[Text] New York May 5 TASS--Finding the way to curb the nuclear arms race and thus strengthen peace and security--the most burning problem of our time--is in the focus of attention at the session of the United Nations Commission on Disarmament which has opened in New York.

The delegates stressed the need for considering the problem in all its aspects which would facilitate the effective elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

The first day of the session showed, however, that the United States opposed any, however limited, measures that would reduce the threat of war.

Contrary to logic, it insisted on excluding from the agenda the item on curbing the race of naval armaments.

The non-constructive demarche was resolutely rejected by all other delegates.

Japan Backs Test Ban

LD080848 Moscow TASS in English 0900 GMT 8 May 86

[Text] Tokyo May 8 TASS--Japan stands for the earliest conclusion of an international treaty on a complete nuclear weapon test ban, Imai, a representative of Japan, told a session of the U.N. Disarmament Commission in New York, according to the newspaper ASAHI. Japan decisively suggests beginning within the shortest possible time work to draw up such a treaty, the representative of this country said.

USSR's Bessmertnykh Addresses Conference

PM081445 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 86 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Tolkunov under general headline: "Peace and Security Are the Peoples' Demand"]

[Text] New York, 7 May--The latest session of the UN Disarmament Commission has started work in New York. Speaking during its general discussion, A.A. Bessmertnykh, USSR deputy foreign minister and head of the Soviet delegation, drew the attention of the session's participants to the fact that M.S. Gorbachev's 15 January statement this year was an epoch-making event in the Soviet Union's international activity, a kind of fusion of the philosophy of the shaping of a secure peace in the nuclear and space age with a platform of specific actions. The statement sets forth specific proposals concerning the total and universal elimination of nuclear weapons within the next 15 years and other far-reaching measures to strengthen international security. Developing and supplementing them, the 27th CPSU Congress proclaimed that the Soviet Union intends to persistently seek the implementation of these proposals. This is the central avenue of the USSR's foreign policy for forthcoming years.

We are profoundly satisfied, the speaker continued, by the interested, promising reaction with which the world public and broad political circles in various countries have greeted the Soviet initiatives. The reason for the positive response is no secret: The Soviet formula for man's gradual liberation from nuclear and other weapons of mass annihilation is oriented toward the peoples' needs and aspirations and in no way toward anything else.

The USSR representative set forth in detail the main provisions of the Soviet nuclear disarmament plan which is a realistic and therefore preferable alternative to the proposals of those who are demanding the creation of space strike armaments. The Soviet Union proposes completely dispensing with nuclear weapons.

Recently, the Soviet representative continued, the USSR came out with a broad new initiative for a substantial reduction of all ground troops and tactical aviation from the Atlantic to the Urals. Here two processes mutually supplement each other: the processes of nuclear and nonnuclear disarmament. In particular, under the recent Soviet proposal, along with conventional armaments there would be a reduction in tactical nuclear armaments. The USSR attaches no less importance to ridding our planet of chemical weapons.

The logic of the struggle against the nuclear threat, the Soviet delegate noted, has brought to the surface of international relations the problem of halting nuclear weapons tests. The conclusions of authoritative specialists and simple common sense indicate that it is precisely here that the shortest path lies to sharply slowing down the arms race. Moreover, today every objective prerequisite has been met for resolving the question of a total ban on nuclear explosions without infringing on anyone's security. The UN Disarmament Commission can have an important say on the question of immediately initiating talks on all aspects of nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear tests, including the necessary verification [kontrol] measures.

It was stated that it is very important to ensure that the commission constructively examines the question of limiting naval armaments. Right now, without waiting for the start of all-embracing talks, it is essential to take urgent measures on a priority basis for the relaxation of military tension

in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union advocates breaking through the inertia of formalism and routine and breathing new life into the work of the entire mechanism for reviewing and resolving disarmament questions, including the important link that the UN Disarmament Commission is in this mechanism.

The speeches by the delegates of the GDR, Bulgaria, Vietnam, New Zealand, Bangladesh, and other countries also voiced an urgent appeal to put an end to the arms race, to take specific actions in this direction immediately, and to put an end to the nuclear threat forever.

Press Briefing in Moscow

PM141337 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 May 86 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "At the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center"]

[Excerpt] A briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists on current issues in international relations was held at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center on 12 May.

V.B. Limeyko, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Department who spoke at the briefing, commented on the work of the UN Disarmament Commission session taking place in New York. In particular, it was noted that despite U.S. attempts to avoid discussing major issues and to confine matters to debates on organizational and technical aspects, the participants in the session concentrated attention on the really important problems of international security.

The leitmotiv of the speeches of a wide range of delegations was the prevention of an arms race in space, the banning of nuclear tests, the reduction and elimination of nuclear arms, and the quest for solutions on conventional arms. There was a wide positive response from the session participants to the large-scale Soviet initiatives in the arms limitation and disarmament sphere set forth in M.S. Gorbaсhev's 15 January statement and reaffirmed in the 27th CPSU Congress decisions.

The Soviet Union advocates breathing new life into the work of the entire machinery for the discussion of disarmament questions, including such an important component as the UN Disarmament Commission, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said. And this commission could undoubtedly have an important say on the question of the urgent commencement of talks on all aspects of nuclear disarmament and the banning of nuclear tests.

Bloc Raises Naval Issues

LD200635 Moscow TASS in English 0630 GMT 20 May 86

[Text] New York, May 20 TASS--The delegations of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union called for an early opening of talks and consultations on planning specific steps to limit the operations of naval

fleets, reduce naval arms and spread confidence measures to the seas and oceans. The three delegations submitted a working document for consideration to the current session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission here. The document took note of the need for reversing the continuing escalation of the race in naval arms. The document said in part that the delegations of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union welcomed the beginning of consultations on that matter in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. By way of the urgent measure agreement could be reached on the non-expansion of naval operations of the states in the regions through which the busiest shipping routes pass and where the possibility of conflict situations is most probable--the Indian, Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea or the Persian Gulf.

With regard to one of such regions--the Mediterranean where dangerous developments are taking place--the sides could come to terms on the application of agreed confidence measures, on the reduction of the armed forces, on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons, on renouncing the deployment of such weapons on the territory of the non-nuclear Mediterranean countries and on the nuclear powers pledging not to use such weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit their deployment on its territory. At the first phase, the document emphasized, no limitations of any kind would be imposed on the naval operations and naval arms of the Mediterranean states. As to further steps to enhance security in that region, they could be defined with due account of the Soviet proposals set forth in the January 15 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and aiming for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, the GDR and the USSR believe that the realization of the Soviet Union-formulated nuclear disarmament program and the proposal on working out fundamental elements of a comprehensive system of international security would undoubtedly block off ways of the race in any arms, including naval arms. The working document emphasized that if the United States withdrew its fleet from the Mediterranean Sea the same would be done simultaneously by the Soviet Union which was prepared to open talks on that matter without delay.

Such regional measures, as the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of stable peace and cooperation, the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and the implementation of measures to strengthen peace and security in the Persian Gulf would be of positive importance, the document said.

Session Ends

LD240634 Moscow TASS in English 0622 GMT 24 May 86

[Text] New York May 24 TASS--TASS correspondent Sergey Baybakov reports:

The annual session of the U.N. Commission on Disarmament has come to a close at the U.N. Headquarters. The function of the commission is to work out concrete recommendations for U.N. working bodies which tackle disarmament matters.

The central place on the agenda was occupied by the discussion of the problems of curbing the nuclear arms race and of achieving nuclear disarmament. The session discussed, in particular, the Soviet Union's proposals on complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, set out in the January 15 statement of Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The delegations of socialist countries went to the session with a steady resolve to achieve progress on the matter, on the solution of which the very future of mankind depends, Eugeniusz Noworyta, permanent representative of Poland at the United Nations, stated on behalf of the socialist countries' group. The proposals are prompted not only by the peaceful foreign policy of socialist countries but also by the awareness that the arms race has reached a critical point which dictates the need for an utterly new political thinking and an innovative approach to disarmament matters, the Polish delegate emphasized.

Plenary meetings and discussions in the working groups of the commission have revealed the interest of most countries in holding talks with a view to reversing the nuclear arms race and achieving complete and final elimination of nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The delegates have included a recommendation that such talks be held in the commission's annual report which _____ endorsed.

However, as representatives of many countries pointed out, the commission has not been able to work out practical recommendations concerning an urgent solution of the problems of disarmament and the taking of measures to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, and to end the arms race, particularly that in the nuclear field. The lack of the USA's and its Western allies' readiness to discuss practical steps in the field of disarmament is the main obstacle to that. Thus, owing to the unwillingness of the delegations of the USA and of a number of other countries, the commission failed to work out concrete recommendations on a nuclear test ban. An end to nuclear tests is the most realistic way to begin to slow down the nuclear arms race, said V.V. Shustov, deputy permanent representative of the USSR at the United Nations. The termination of tests may serve as the thread by pulling which it would be possible to untangle the knot of problems connected with the curbing of the nuclear arms race.

The Soviet Union has already three times extended its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, the delegate of the USSR stated. "We, however, do not suggest that only this one measure be resorted to. We are for starting talks without delay on a total nuclear test ban. But in reply, nuclear explosions are conducted one after another at the Nevada test range.

"The initiators of a further spiralling up of the arms race proclaim in words U.S. readiness to seek a reduction and even complete elimination of nuclear arms together with the Soviet Union. The latest test in Nevada shows, however, that those assurances remain only verbal declarations", the Soviet representative said.

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RELATED ISSUES

CANADA: INTERNATIONAL PEACE, DISARMAMENT MEETING

Vancouver THE SUN in English 28 Apr 86 p A3

[Text]

The number one priority in obtaining world peace is to stop all further testing of nuclear weapons, according to delegates of the Vancouver Centennial Peace and Disarmament Symposium.

"The ban was number one in everybody's mind," said Dr. Thomas Perry, who chaired a weekend committee meeting to draft the Vancouver Proposals for Peace, which will be sent to the United Nations and the governments of Canada, the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The seven proposals were presented to the people of Vancouver at the B.C. Place Stadium peace rally Sunday by American Paul Warnke, a negotiator for the U.S. SALT II treaty, and Russian Vitaly Zhurkin. Both were on the 25-person international committee who came up with the proposals.

The other proposals were:

- A ban on all weapons in space.
- A freeze on development, testing or deployment of new nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
- Immediate and substantial reductions in the existing nuclear arsenals.
- The establishment of nuclear weapons-free zones around the world.
- Renunciation by all states, and in particular by the nuclear weapons states, of the use of force and intervention in the affairs of other states, and a commitment to negotiate an agreement to that effect.
- Recognizing that the arms race is having serious negative effects on the whole world, it is necessary to reduce military budgets and transfer the resources saved to the promotion of human well-being.

Perry said there "was unanimous agreement of everyone involved" in developing the proposals, which came from ideas exchanged throughout the peace symposium.

"What really impressed me was the cooperative nature of everyone in reaching compromises," he said.

Noble peace prize winner Sean MacBride of Ireland and chemistry prize winner Dorothy Hodgkin of Britain developed the basic principles for the proposals over the last few months, Perry said, after compiling ideas sent to them in advance by conference participants.

He said the purpose of the proposals are to allow the conference to have an impact on educating not only the people in Vancouver on peace, but the people of the world.

Joan Ruddock of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, keynote speaker at the Sunday rally, said the recent U.S. military attack on Libya brings the fear of nuclear weapons a lot closer to home.

"The overwhelming majority of British people have condemned that action," she said.

She attacked the three main arguments used to defend the existence of nuclear weapons — that they will be used only in retaliation, that they can be used in a limited capacity and that Europe needs U.S. bases in order to have peace — as fictions.

"We need Canada to get Britain and the U.S. to accept the Soviet moratorium on testing . . . We have to shift the resources from death-giving weapons to life-giving weapons," she said to much crowd applause.

In Toronto, about 500 people attending a peace demonstration Saturday were told the federal government is lying to Canadians about the country's involvement in the arms race.

Angela Browning, chairman of the Against Cruise Testing for Disarmament Coalition, said Canada is quietly becoming more involved

with the U.S. space weapons and other weapons programs.

She said that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney "says we're not officially involved in Star Wars but Mr. Mulroney is a liar."

She said a recently signed five-year North American Air Defence treaty paves the way for direct Canadian participation in the testing and deployment of the space-based anti-missile system.

"In the new agreement, a crucial clause banning Canadian participation in anti-ballistic missile systems has been removed and this undoubtedly will lead to some kind of involvement with Star Wars," she said.

Browning said that Canada's involvement in the U.S. nuclear buildup makes it a party to "the legal terrorism of the two superpowers who are holding the entire world hostage."

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RELATED ISSUES

CANADA: LITTON TO MODERNIZE FOUR DESTROYERS

Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English 10 May 86 p A8

[Text]

OTTAWA (CP) — Litton Systems Canada Ltd. has landed its second mammoth defence contract in less than a month.

The contract is an estimated \$1.2-billion deal to modernize four Canadian destroyers to defend against sea-skimming missiles, Associate Defence Minister Harvie Andre confirmed Friday.

Rear Adm. Charles Thomas, maritime policy chief, said the announcement was "a great day for the navy." Andre said Canada's North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies are pleased with the move.

Thomas indicated the ships will be used along with six new frigates for protecting other ships, with the destroyers providing an umbrella of air cover within a 100-nautical-mile radius.

The DDH-280 destroyers originally were built to track and fight submarines, but the 1982 Falklands War and the Persian Gulf war between Iran and Iraq have highlighted the need for naval air defences.

The destroyers' equipment will include sophisticated electronic sensing equipment, a vertically-launched missile, a close-in rapid fire gun known as the Phalanx, a rapid-fire 76 mm deck gun and two sub-hunting Sea King helicopters.

"WHAT HAS happened is a quantum jump in the threat," Andre said. "Ships at sea now can be exposed to air attack delivered by airplanes, by other ships or by submarines. We just need to have the capability of defending against that."

Toronto-based Litton received approval in mid-April to handle a major share of another \$800-million contract to provide low-level air defence systems for Canadian air and ground forces.

Andre insisted that the destroyer deal will not stall other items on the Defence Department's "wish list."

"We are in need of submarines, there are minor war vessels which I would like to proceed with. There are the second and third stages of the frigate program I would like to proceed with. In the meantime, the army has a whole list of equipment.

"Unless I can convince (Finance Minister Michael) Wilson to give me great gobs of new money we're going to have to stretch those out over time."

However, Andre contended that department money managers have calculated the destroyer program can be handled with a slice of the current capital expenditure budget — about one quarter of the total \$10.2-billion total defence budget for 1986-87 — and by cutting corners on operational expenses.

The current modernization schedule called for work to begin on modernizing the Algonquin last month and to last until November 1987, when work on the Iroquois is to begin.

Shipyard work on the first two ships will be done by Versatile Davie Inc. of Lauzon, Que., across the St. Lawrence River from Quebec City. Yard work on the second two ships, the Huron and the Athabaskan, will be up for competition.

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RELATED ISSUES

BRIEFS

ITALIAN DELEGATION IN USSR--Moscow, 27 May (TASS)--Soviet-Italian political consultations were held in the USSR Foreign Ministry on May 26-27. During the consultations the sides exchanged views on key problems of European security and disarmament. They also discussed some questions of bilateral relations. G. Januzzi, deputy general director of the political department of the Italian Foreign Ministry, took part in the consultations on the Italian side. He was received by V.F. Petrovskiy, deputy foreign minister of the USSR. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1927 GMT 27 May 86 LD] /9738

USSR'S BESSMERTNYKH MEETS PEREZ DE CUELLAR--New York, May 7 TASS--A.A. Bessmertnykh, deputy foreign minister of the USSR, and Yu. V. Dubinin, the USSR's permanent representative at the United Nations, on Tuesday met with UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuella. During the conversation, they discussed questions connected with the UN role in the field of arms control, first of all with regard to nuclear weapons. The UN secretary-general highly assessed the Soviet Union's initiatives, especially Mikhail Gorbachev's January 15, 1986, statement and the Soviet leader's proposals set forth in Berlin. He also thanked the Soviet Government for its constant support for the UN which was especially important at the current difficult period for the world body. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2232 GMT 6 May 86 LD] /6662

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